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1. Preface 
Design is an act of organizing reality. Designers create artifacts that fill in our 
daily lives, making up the environments we live in and the tools we use in 
everyday activities. Design as an applied science is important in shaping our 
society and has been so long before its current status as a discipline. The design 
process affords many intriguing research questions. How do artifacts come into 
being? Why do some artifacts appear so special that we call them creative? 
More specific riddles can be laid, but who should answer them? Psychology 
investigates mechanisms underlying human behavior; does it have answers for 
design? The psychological discipline has existed for a relatively short period of 
time, but it has already provided plenty of information about human behavior in 
various domains. Design is definitely one of those. The biggest steps in the 
psychology of design have been taken during the last three decades. The 
progress has happened mainly under the flag of cognitivism, a new 
psychological paradigm born in the 1950’s. Cognitivism and the more recently 
surfaced cognitive science have provided psychology with methods and 
concepts that have made it possible to explore and explain new kinds of 
psychological phenomena. This has also occurred for design where concepts of 
information processing have been adopted (Simon, 1996). Although some 
particular areas, such as conceptual product design, are yet to have their own 
theory. 
The history of the psychological research of design from the problem-solving 
perspective is a relatively short one, but has already caused a paradigm shift in 
design research. A growing number of theories about and models of human 
designing are cognitively oriented and often referred to as the design cognition 
literature, which is based on the symbolic paradigm of cognitive science. Still, it 
seems that the design cognition approach has not yet been able to fulfill its 
promise - to provide a detailed account of design as cognitive activity - as the 
most of research publications still discuss their results in the future tense rather 
than the present, i.e. focusing more on what should be done than on what has 
been achieved thus far. Optimistically interpreted, this means that there is still a 
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plenty of room for investigation to be done, and indeed a lot of energy is 
currently invested into design studies worldwide. 
This thesis describes a research effort within the paradigm of symbolic 
cognitivism. I have chosen to investigate problem decomposition, one of the 
classical components of the problem-solving architecture, in the environment of 
conceptual design of products, using classical methods to derive new results. 
The work is organized in four chapters. The introduction presents a brief 
overview of cognitive science and the methods and concepts of design, 
concentrating on the particular theories of problem solving. A reader who is 
already familiar with the basics of cognitive science and problem solving can 
therefore skip the first sections and step straight into section 2.4 of Introduction, 
in which the links between this work and the heterogeneous creativity research 
are discussed. The synthesis continues in section 2.5, which introduces a 
cognitive model of design idea generation and the study question. The 
experimental chapter describes how this question was evaluated empirically; it 
is followed by the results. The work is finished off with a chapter on 
conclusions and speculations as to why the results turned out the way they did. 
This is by nature multidisciplinary and the review is written in a verbose style 
considering the engineer audience, who might not be familiar with the theories 
of cognitive science and cognitive scientists who know little about design. The 
variant of protocol analysis developed for this investigation is also reported in 
detail. With this preface, it is my hope that the reader will find decomposition a 
topic of justified interest. In the text, I have chosen to refer to a designer as 
“she” or “her” regardless of the hypothetical designer’s sex. 
2. Introduction 
If cognitive science does not exist then it is 
necessary to invent it. 
(Johnson-Laird, 1980) 
This thesis is an empirical study of internal solution search in conceptual design 
of products inquiring the role of problem decomposition in it. The method 
chosen for the study, protocol analysis, is one of the classical methods of 
cognitive science. However, as the quotation from Johnson-Laird notes, it may 
still be uncertain what this discipline is. In order to present a thesis in the 
context of a discipline, it is advisable to define the discipline and the paradigm 
within. This is particularly clarifying if there exists as a wide range of opinions 
on the essence of the field as there is in cognitive science, which has become 
generally known only after the 1970’s. 
Concerning cognitive science 
Cognition is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as 
The action or faculty of knowing taken in its 
widest sense, including sensation, perception, 
conception, etc., as distinguished from feeling and 
volition; also, more specifically, the action of 
cognizing an object in perception proper. 
Oxford English Online, version 2 
Cognitive science is hence a wide-ranging domain, not a discipline but possibly 
several: cognitive sciences. The development began in the 1950’s when the 
information processing approach started to invade the psychological discipline. 
This new view was greatly influenced by the invention of digital computing and 
it borrowed many concepts and working models from the computer science of 
that time. Cognitive science added a computational aspect to psychology, posing 
precision requirements of computer science for psychological theories. This 
approach suggests that human behavior is controlled by mechanisms that are 
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more complex than those proposed by the behaviorists. Instead of regarding 
thinking as a mere mediation of behavior, cognitivism appreciates the multitude 
of explanations, usually building on the concept of cognitive structures (Mayer, 
1992). 
The majority of the theoretical work presented here takes the unitary (Anderson, 
1983), computational approach (Marr, 1982) to cognition, which is compatible 
with the physical symbol system hypothesis advocated by Newell (e.g. Newell, 
1990; Newell & Simon, 1972).The discussion about whether this approach is 
adequate for explaining human behavior is essential. Goel, using design as a 
example target, has considered this issue at length and his primary conclusion is 
that physical symbols systems are sufficient, but restricted means (Goel, 1995). 
The alternative, connectionist approaches to design and creative processes are 
rare and will not be considered in this work. 
This work addresses the human cognition underlying creative design work, 
particularly conceptual design of products. The main motive comes from the 
fact that conceptual design is still poorly understood as a psychological activity 
(see section 2.5), but it still affords the investigation of decomposition well. In 
order to achieve a linkage between two separate disciplines, the theoretical part 
reviews some concepts of general cognition, goes through specific aspects of 
creative cognition, and finally grapples with some issues of design practice and 
cognition. The objective of the theoretical work is to provide the reader with an 
overall understanding of conceptual design as cognitive activity and describe 
how a process called problem decomposition is related to conceptual design. 
Therefore, this introduction will first introduce a cognitive model of conceptual 
design, and then ask the question of how a component of the model, 
decomposition, can be empirically examined with the methods of cognitive 
science. The experimental results will question the role of decomposition in 
actual design, revealing the need for additional investigations. 
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Exclusions 
Many interesting but not strongly related things must be omitted from the 
theoretical work. The missed bypaths are mentioned in the appropriate locations 
along the way, but it must be now stated that individual differences and 
abnormalities, and developmental issues are completely dismissed. This study 
examines the expert designers of today and the future, who have been highly 
educated in their own field, not the neophytes in design. The design process as a 
whole, and especially conceptual design, includes a lot of decision-making 
which is another excluded subject. And of course, the human behavior, 
including design, is not a static, but flexible process that steadily improves. 
However, learning presents a different research domain that is ruled out of this 
work. 
Cognitive structures 
Cognitive science is about explaining psychological phenomena by using 
concepts based on human information processing models. The traditional model 
is the man-computer metaphor that sees a human being as equivalent to a 
universal computer or Turing machine (Turing, 1950). This model, influenced 
by the idea of digital computer, includes the following components: memory 
systems, central processing, perceptual, sensory, and motor systems. Each 
component has been extensively studied along with the major functions such as 
language, reasoning, decision making, and problem solving. This work is 
concerned with the central components and will omit the perceptual and motor 
functions (Eysenck & Keane, 2000). 
Cognitive architectures 
The key question in cognitive science concerns the cognitive structures; what 
are the central functions of cognition and how they are organized. Several 
propositions exist. Some of these propositions are models in a more abstract 
sense, for instance the models of creative process, while others are more formal 
and are realized as computational, symbolic models. In the last three decades, a 
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couple of very detailed computational models of cognitive structures have been 
introduced. These models are known as the cognitive architectures, the best 
examples of which are SOAR and ACT1 (Anderson, 1990; Newell, 1990). These 
architectures are important in proving that computational systems can carry out 
many complex activities with an effort and accuracy comparable to that of 
humans. Explicit architectures also facilitate the evaluation of underlying 
assumptions by simulating complex interactions afforded by the theories; even 
though they have some inherent limitations (see Lewis, 2001). I feel that all 
cognitive theories should be implemented in some architecture or a 
computational model in order to assess their feasibility and I fully agree with 
Anderson who stated (Anderson, 1980 in Russell and Norvig, 2003) “a 
cognitive theory should be like a computer program.” 
Memory and attention 
Memory is one of the most essential human cognitive capacities. It would be 
impossible to imagine a culture such as ours without the memory resources of a 
human. There exists a great variety of different psychological characterizations 
of memory. Associationism is an old way of describing the nature of memory, 
which has been adopted by psychologists. Currently there exist several 
psychological memory models that could be called associative. Before 
introducing these fairly recent applications of the old principles, I will take a 
glance at the first half of the 20th century. 
The idea of memory stores is an elemental part of the computer metaphor, as the 
architecture of a digital computer includes transient and persistent memory 
stores in addition to a central information processing unit. The quest for 
identifying corresponding memory systems in humans can be considered to be 
one of the first steps in the cognitive revolution that began in 1956 (Bechtel et 
                                                 
1 The Adaptive Character of Thought model (ACT) has had several revisions. The current model 
is called ACT-R 6. See http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/. 
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al., 2001). But actually, the idea of memory stores with different temporal 
characteristics was suggested before that era by Hebb (1949). He proposed a 
distinction between long- and short-term memories that was adopted by 
cognitive scientists. Short-term memory (STM) has a limited capacity, but it is 
rapidly accessible. STM contents decay fast, therefore it must be connected to 
LTM that allows finite amounts of information to be stored for elongated period 
of times. Long-term memory can be accessed relatively fast, but storing new 
information takes time. To compensate for the slowness of writing to LTM, an 
external memory (EM) can be utilized. EM refers to all objects in the world, 
including notebooks, other people, product catalogs, Internet, and so forth. Thus, 
using EM memory requires both perceptive and motor actions (Newell & 
Simon, 1972). 
More detailed memory theories subsist. For a while it was believed that short-
term memory would be a unitary cognitive component and its capacity could be 
stated in content-independent chunks. Miller infamously stated that this volume 
was “seven plus minus two” units (Miller, 1956)2. This view was replaced a few 
decades later by a multi-component theory of STM (Baddeley, 2003)and the 
estimates of the capacity have been reduced (Cowan, 2001). The best known 
model is Baddeley’s working memory model. It is composed of four 
independent STM components processing different types of information: a 
phonological loop, a visuospatial sketchpad, and an episodic buffer. These 
buffers are coupled to a common central executive and to corresponding long-
term stores (Baddeley, 2003). The specialization of short-term memory 
structures leads to further questions about long-term memory, such as how 
information is stored, what is this information like, and how it is accessed. A 
part of this discussion goes under the name of knowledge representation. 
Several propositions have been made about it, but only some necessary for the 
                                                 
2 The ‘magical number seven’ has since become accepted as a psychological fact in applied 
sciences, although this it has been shown that this estimate was not correct 
 Lassi A Liikkanen Exploring problem decomposition 8  
current work will be pointed out see (e.g. Eysenck & Keane, 2000; Mayer, 
1992). 
First, there are specialized computational models of memory retrieval and 
recognition, such as SAM and MINERVA 2. They use an associative structure 
to explain memory storage and retrieval (see a review in Raaijmakers & 
Shiffrin, 1992). The basic idea is that memory search is rather simple, 
probabilistic process, controlled by few variables (Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 
1981). This can be elaborated by saying that LTM is built on associations. 
However, it is more informative to refer to semantic organization as a guiding 
principle of associations. It has been proposed that LTM is organized in 
semantic hierarchies, so that concepts such as animals, mammals, dogs, and cats 
are associated together in a (prototypical) semantic network of nodes and links 
(Eysenck & Keane, 2000). Concepts and their properties are connected together 
with cue validity, a property comparable to associative strength. However, there 
is experimental evidence that have displayed several effects that are compatible 
with the theory and confirmed it to a certain extent, although some theorists 
heavily disagree with this type of “semantic decomposition” (see Keane, 1997 
and Lakoff, 1986). 
It is also believed that there is more than just one type of memory, just as there 
are STM modules, and that these types of information are stored in different 
formats (the format of knowledge –question). The most fundamental difference 
is between propositional and visual information, which are very likely two 
separate systems (Eysenck & Keane, 2000). There is possibly a dedicated 
format for each sensory channel (tactile, olfactory, etc.). Additionally, types 
such as explicit or declarative, procedural, episodic knowledge have been 
suggested. Declarative knowledge is usually propositional and semantic, for 
example “Switzerland has no coast line”, whereas procedural knowledge is 
about guiding behavior through if-then type of rules such as “if I go to 
Switzerland, I don’t take my diving equipment with me”. Knowledge types are 
very essential for determining other cognitive structures, because the differences 
in knowledge must show in the processes that handle the knowledge. For 
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instance, a control structure for problem-solving might be based on procedural 
knowledge, while these structures would in turn process declarative knowledge 
(Anderson, 1983; Eysenck & Keane, 2000). 
Going from the small bits of knowledge to bigger compositions such as large 
mechanical devices, schemata are often mentioned. They are used to refer to 
extensive, connected chunks of information, and can be used to guide perception 
and acquisition of new information. Today they have been somewhat replaced 
by a more recent concept of mental representations, but these two concepts are 
different. The major difference is that schemata contain procedural knowledge 
whereas mental models are declarative, although conceptualizations vary 
between theorists. To avoid unnecessary confusion after this point, only schema 
will be used from this point on. Extensive discussion on schemata, mental 
models, scripts, and frames can be found elsewhere (Boden, 2004; Eysenck & 
Keane, 2000; Finke et al., 1992). 
Declarative or semantic knowledge can be defined more precisely. The theory of 
long-term working memory (LT-WM) has proposed that expert’s memory 
consists of memory chunks that grouped together. It is assumed that a “higher-
level” chunk contains “pointers” (references) to “lower-level” chunks (Ericsson 
& Kintsch, 1995). This sort of formulation resembles the prototypical approach 
discussed above. For example, the Tequila Sunrise is a mixture of alcohol, 
grenadine, ice, and orange juice. The concept of Tequila Sunrise consists of 
certain components, but the concept has at least its own name to distinguish it 
from other concepts that may have similar constituents. This work will use this 
simple model of knowledge representation as a working hypothesis in later 
chapters. 
Memory research is still in progress. In spite of the recent development, the 
original, quite abstract information-processing model based on the computer 
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metaphor still seems acceptable. It can be accepted in principle by authors that 
hold otherwise incompatible views3. It is therefore also used in current study. 
Attent ion 
While memory is undeniably the one most essential factors of human cognition, 
the existence of a central executive in Baddeley’s memory model reminds us 
that memory is not a sufficient concept for explaining all cognitive activity. 
Attention is another component that has an important role. Attention is usually 
seen as a process which selects what information we become aware of. This can 
mean both focusing on and ruling out thoughts and sensory information 
(Eysenck & Keane, 2000). Attention, like STM, is limited and in normal 
circumstances, only one thing can be attended at a time. This makes the 
conscious human information processing serial. Failures to maintain attention, 
e.g. in tests of vigilance, can lead to significant trouble in cognitive activities. 
Considering narrow attention together with the limitations of short-term 
memory, two centrals limits to human problem solving have been introduced. 
                                                 
3 See Cowan (2001) and commentaries in the special issue of Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
Volume 24, issue 1 
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Problem-solving research 
It is not my aim to surprise or shock you … But the 
simplest way I can summarize is to say that there 
are now in the world machines that think, that 
learn and that create.… The range of problems they 
can handle will be coextensive with the range to 
which human mind has been applied. 
(Simon & Newell, 1958) 
Problem solving is one research area of cognitive science. It partially continues 
the exploration began in the early 20th century by the Gestalt school (Duncker, 
1945). After the 1960’s, the information processing approach (cognitive science 
and artificial intelligence) has taken over the problem-solving research. The 
research initially advanced in leaps, but after the fifties and sixties, the progress 
has been more subtle. On the other hand, the cognitive revolution has only 
recently inspired many near and distant disciplines, e.g. design theory. The 
purpose of this section is to review the relevant parts of the problem-solving 
literature and show how conceptual design can be treated as a problem-solving 
activity, as has been claimed by the design theorists (e.g. Pahl & Beitz, 1984) 
Problem solving is an activity that focuses on a problem, however, defining 
what a problem is, can be a problematic. This is because problems are not 
“absolute”, but defined in a context. Objects and situations are not problematic 
in nature, but in a context. For psychological research, this property can be 
described along these lines: 
A person is confronted with a problem when he wants 
something and does not know immediately what series 
of actions he can perform to get it. The desired 
object may be tangible or abstract. It may be 
specific or quite general. It may be a physical 
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object or a set of symbols. 
(Newell & Simon, 1972) emphasis added 
Similar description can be found from other authors, (for instance, Reitman, 
1965). Common to all is the idea of having a goal as a result of an interpretation 
of the problem situation. 
Problem types 
The abstract definition of a problem requires more precision. In cognitive 
science, problems can be categorized to well- and ill- structured problems (WSP 
and ISP). Well-structured problems are those that a problem-solving system can 
unambiguously test to see whether a proposed solution is an answer or not. This 
test determines whether the goal state definite or not. But an initial state must 
also be defined. In games, such as chess, it is clear how the pieces are arranged, 
so the initial state is well-defined. In real life problems, initial state is usually 
incompletely or inaccurately specified, so the initial state is ill-defined. Thus, to 
be a WSP, it is necessary that both the initial and the goal state of the problem 
are well-defined (Newell & Simon, 1972; Reitman, 1965). This requirement can 
be extended by requiring the legal problem-solving operators to be defined, as 
legal moves in chess are (Newell, 1969). Sometimes terms “well- and ill-defined 
problems” are used instead of “well- and ill-structured” problems, but I prefer 
the latter option, which better captures the both ends of the problem situation. 
Given these criteria, is it possible to determine whether a problem is a WSP? 
Simon (1973) found that the strict determination of WSP:s lead to a situation 
where no problems studied so far could not be labeled as well-structured. Thus, 
real problems seem to resist classification. This is comparable to writing one’s 
Master’s thesis that is undeniably an ISP. In spite of being ill-structured, the 
thesis is eventually evaluated and graded, which shows that this ISP indeed has 
some constraints regarding the goal state. It is therefore more realistic to think 
that problems lie somewhere on a continuum between well and ill structured end 
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points than to think that there are only WSP:s and ISP:s (Reitman, 1965; Simon, 
1973). 
One possibility that provides a more flexible and psychologically sound 
classification is to define problem types as radial categories. A radial category 
consists of a set of properties that make up a prototypical member of a 
conceptual category. Category membership is evaluated by the extent that an 
instance matches the prototypical properties (Lakoff, 1986). This approach has 
been applied to separate design and non-design problems. Goel et al. (Goel & 
Pirolli, 1992) included twelve items to the list of design problem features. This 
makes design, including conceptual design, one type of problem solving, so that 
the aforementioned problem dichotomies can be combined to produce a 
presentation, such as Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Tree model of the problem types highlighting some prototypical design 
and non-design disciplines based on Simon (1973) and Goel (1995). 
Finally, an observation about the relation of problem solving and memory must 
be mentioned. Simon has stressed the need for knowledge in solving ISPs. He 
claimed that information from LTM, and possibly from EM, must be used 
comprehensively when solving ISP:s (Simon, 1973). This is due to inadequate 
information provided by an ISP, in terms of the initial state, goal state, and 
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problem solving operations, which must be complemented by the problem 
solver. This implies that ill-structured problem solving is also reproductive (cf. 
Duncker, 1945), it makes much use of what we already know or can easily 
adapt. Now that problems have been introduced as the objects of this study, it is 
time to see how they can be solved according cognitive scientists. 
Cognitive approach 
Cognitive research on problem solving began more as a subject of computer 
science than psychological interest because the researchers were eager to build 
an artificial intelligence (AI) that would equal human thought4. Therefore, it was 
natural that the cognitive structures would be modeled by a computer right from 
the start. To be able to achieve this goal, information about the human style of 
problem solving had to be acquired. First comprehensive model from that 
background was the Problem space theory. (Newell & Simon, 1972; Russell & 
Norvig, 2003) 
Problem space theory 
Probably the most influential framework of problem solving is the Problem 
space theory. It was implemented in a model called General Problem Solver 
(GPS) that was the slickest application of the heuristics models and which was 
referred to at the opening of this section. The theory states that problem solving 
is essentially about representing the problem in an effective way and making 
changes to a representation to transform it to a solution. The model is built on 
the concepts of problem states, problem space and problem solving operations. 
The problem (or solution) states refer to definite solution positions, in terms of 
the problem constituents. E.g. a chess position is a problem state in chess. The 
problem space is a network of all possible problem states connected by nodes 
                                                 
4 An actual discipline called Artificial Intelligence emerged much later, in the late 1980’s 
according to Russell and Norvig (2003). 
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presenting legal problem-solving operations. The initial state denotes the state at 
beginning of the problem-solving process. The goal state(s) is located on the 
other end of the space and additional rules may be needed to identify the goal 
state, as in chess. Connections between states depend on the restrictions problem 
makes on the solution, in the case of chess, the rules of the game. Problem 
solving occurs by applying problem-solving operations (also termed operators 
or actions), which make moves from a problem state towards another state using 
the legal connections. In brief, problem solving is a process of making moves 
within in a problem space. The actual problem is how to select the right moves 
to achieve the goal state (Newell & Simon, 1972). An example of a problem 
space for a simple task called the Tower of Hanoi is displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Visualization of one problem space related to the Tower of Hanoi puzzle. 
The puzzle consists of three pegs and three blocks. Objective is to move all blocks, one 
by one, from the left peg to the right peg. Initial state is located on the top, goal state in 
the bottom right corner. Note that even a simple game has more than twenty seven 
possible states that are shown in the figure. 
The efficiency of the solution search in a problem space can be measured. For 
instance, in the illustrated problem space of the Tower of Hanoi puzzle, there 
are several paths in the problem space that all lead to the goal state(s). It is 
evident from the pictorial description that only some routes are shorter than 
others, and thus, favorable. Roughly speaking, if it is possible to determine one 
or several paths that lead to a goal state with the smallest number of moves, then 
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the solution can be optimized in relation to this particular parameter. However, 
optimization is not possible in all problem environments. In solving ISPs, such 
as design problems, it is impossible to optimize a solution and the problem 
solving becomes a task satisficing task constraints rather than optimizing a 
solution. (Simon, 1996) 
Some problems may not be represented as a single problem space. Problem 
solvers decompose problems to make them more manageable, creating new 
subproblems. The decomposition of a problem leads to a set of subproblems that 
each have their own, perhaps more limited, problem spaces. New subgoals 
maybe added with decomposed at all times during the process. Decomposition is 
therefore a crucial procedure for solving problems of more than a trivial size and 
it is included in most problem-solving theories (Anderson, 1983; Newell & 
Simon, 1972). The application of decomposition assumes that the subproblems 
can be solved independently (Simon, 1996). Violations to this assumption along 
with a more detailed discussion of decomposition will be presented in the 
section 2.5. 
Search methods 
The most important part of problem solving is the selection of problem-solving 
operators. There are two fundamentally different options for doing this: the 
generate-and-test method and constrained search methods. The former method 
generates all possible moves blindly applying all possible operators and the 
latter class uses knowledge to pick some moves over the others. Their details 
will be discussed next. Note that these methods are not specific to the Problem 
space theory, but they are a part of the more extensive AI literature, which 
contains a plethora of methods, many distant from psychology (see Russell & 
Norvig, 2003). 
The conception about the nature of search methods has changed throughout the 
years. In the first AI applications, problem solving was seen as a blind search 
going through all options without any a priori selection of operators. The nature 
of the problem and the number of available operators determined the complexity 
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of the task and the bigger the space, the harder it was to find the goal state. This 
problem was visible even in well-structured problems, for instance in chess, 
where the uninformed search became impractical due to combinatorial 
explosion (Russell & Norvig, 2003). This gave a good reason to suspect that 
other problem-solving methods are needed as generate-and-test was neither 
psychologically plausible. 
There are several ways that the search process can be constrained by knowledge. 
Traditionally these are called strong and weak methods. Strong methods are 
procedures that lead to a correct answer, such as mathematical functions. Strong 
methods are typically domain-dependent and their activation requires 
recognizing the fit between the problem situation and the method (Russell & 
Norvig, 2003). One strong method is recognition, which means that complete 
solutions may be recognized and retrieved in entirety from the knowledge base. 
Weak methods, sometimes called strategies, were an essential part of the GPS. 
They do not guarantee a success and can even bypass the optimum solution. 
They either work on an abstract, syntactic, level or apply some general 
heuristics as means to problem solving and are thus domain-independent. Weak 
methods in psychological problem-solving models include means-ends analysis 
(MEA) and hill climbing (Newell & Simon, 1972). 
Weak and strong methods can apply domain-dependent rules5 heuristics (rules 
of thumb) relevant to the particular problem. Heuristics are simple, and 
therefore, the problem solver must possess lots of them for being effective. The 
more specific the heuristic is, the more likely it is applicable only to a single 
situation (Newell & Simon, 1972). The options presented this far have been 
summarized in Figure 3. 
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5 Concepts of weak methods and heuristics are sometimes used interchangeably. In this work it 
is assumed that weak methods are general, domain-independent and heuristics specific, domain-
dependent methods. The use of the term heuristics also varies from author to author, see e.g. 
Boden (2004)and Simon and Newell (1958). 
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Look-up tables Means-end Hill-climbing 
Informed Uninformed 
Generate-and-Test Weak Strong 
Search methods
Algorithms 
Figure 3. Classification of general problem solving methods with some examples 
from problem-solving and AI literature. 
While the selection of problem-solving operators is an important part, problem 
solving is also constrained by the limitations of general cognitive structures, 
which were considered earlier. Short-term memory is capacity limited and may 
thus impede the solving of more complex problems. Long-term memory has a 
very large capacity, but has problems with retrieval and storage. External 
memory is thus a valuable aid for the problem solver, as new solutions may be 
found from the environment and external memory can be used to overcome 
limitations of STM and LTM.  
The Problem space theory has been implemented as a computational model and 
its operation has been compared with human performance. This has been done 
on few well-structured problems, e.g. theorem proving, Moore-Anderson, and 
cryptarithmetic tasks. The results were inspiring. The GPS model could solve 
several types of problems and seemed to produce the solutions in a similar 
manner as human problem solvers (Newell & Simon, 1972). However, the GPS 
had some limitations. The greatest concern has been the limited validity of 
laboratory experiments that used simple problems. One aspect is the acquisition 
and administration of the knowledge needed for the problem solving. In the 
examples problems used in the experiments, all information was provided in 
terms of legal operators and well-defined initial and goal states, whereas 
problems in real life are different. It seems that the Problem space theory at best 
describes only well-structured problem solving (Eysenck & Keane, 2000). This 
problem was well perceived at the time when the model was introduced by other 
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AI researchers and the model was accused of unwarranted promises, starting 
from its name (see McDermott, 1976). In this work I have chosen to include the 
Problem space theory as a reference point, especially because the AI research 
has since the 1970’s diverged from psychology and cognitive science (Russell & 
Norvig, 2003), but the concepts are still widely used. 
Expert ise 
The GPS and similar efforts considered only a limited class of problems. 
However, there has been an interest to understand more complex, ill-structured 
problem solving from the information-processing perspective. As a result, the 
expertise research that focuses on more difficult and realistic problem 
environments (cf. Voss & Post, 1988) has emerged. It had already been 
proposed that ill structured problems, in particular, are knowledge-sensitive 
(Simon, 1973) and it followed that the expertise research focused on the 
knowledge structures that make sophisticated problem solving possible. This 
also shifted the focus of AI to the knowledge-based or expert systems. 
Expertise is defined as a domain-specific skill acquired by a substantial amount 
of training. It results in a knowledge base that quantitatively and qualitatively 
differs from a database of a novice (Ericsson & Smith, 1991a). Where does this 
difference actually originate and how is expertise embedded in the cognitive 
structures? First suggestion was that the difference is due to a more effective 
chunking, not to bigger short-term memory capacity as such. It seems that 
expertise allows bigger information structures to be used as chunks, where as 
novices rely on more simple chunks. In chess, this could mean using complete 
position board patterns as chunks, instead of single pieces. This claim has been 
proofed quite consistently over the years (Charness, 1991). However, chunking 
theory is not the only possible or even adequate explanation for experts’ 
extraordinary performance. For example, recently it has been suggested that this 
skilled memory could be facilitated by long-term working memory (Ericsson & 
Kintsch, 1995; Eysenck & Keane, 2000). 
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Whichever theory we choose, it seems that expertise leads to sophisticated LTM 
structures. It has been proposed that expertise affects both schematic 
(procedural) and declarative knowledge bases of a person (Mayer, 1992). The 
different types of knowledge make it possible for the expert to handle many 
types of problems effectively, e.g. they do not blindly select procedures that are 
uncertain or loading and normally rely on a database of declarative knowledge. 
If the solution is not directly recognized, then the experts can proceed in their 
problem solving by using procedural knowledge to decompose (analyze) the ill 
structured problem into a set of well-structured problems, which can then be 
solved with declarative knowledge (Chi et al., 1988). This work also makes the 
assumption, that the reuse of existing knowledge is the key concept for 
understanding design. 
This far expertise has been considered from a general perspective. However, 
several domains of ill structured problem solving have been investigated, not 
only chess. These include specific cases of observing challenging decision-
making processes (Voss & Post, 1988), scientific discovery (Klahr & Simon, 
1999), and design (Smith & Browne, 1993). Each area has received notable 
attention, but only design problem solving will be considered in detail in the 
section 2.5 see also (Chi et al., 1988; Ericsson & Smith, 1991b; Mayer, 1992). 
Analogical  thinking 
Analogical thinking is a weak problem-solving method that supports 
knowledge-based problem solving (Klahr & Simon, 1999). If a solution to a 
particular problem is missing, a solution to another problem can possibly be 
used as a model. This is the idea of analogical problem solving. Analogies do 
not solely serve the purpose of problem solving as they are used in everyday 
conversations as explanations and arguments (Thagard et al., 1990). 
Analogical inference is a process that is commonly accepted to have two stages: 
retrieval and mapping. Retrieval refers simply to the activation of certain 
knowledge structures, say solution to a similar problem and the unsolved 
problem at hand. Mapping then connects these source and target structures 
 Lassi A Liikkanen Exploring problem decomposition 22  
together, if possible. Of these phases, mapping is the most essential. At least 
three types of constraints affect the mapping process: structural, semantic, and 
pragmatic. Several, highly sophisticated computational models of analogical 
mapping exist, but they are not discussed here (see Hummel & Holyoak, 1997 
for details). 
What makes analogies especially interesting for design problem solving is their 
connection to creativity. For example, in the history of scientific discovery, 
several remarkable breakthroughs seem to originate from a visual analogy 
(Klahr & Simon, 1999; Weisberg, 1986). An interface to analogical thinking 
should therefore be included in a cognitive model of conceptual design, because 
it is likely that design can benefit from analogical thinking in many ways. Next 
section will introduce the creativity research to see if it has any other 
connections with problem-solving or conceptual design. 
Creativity research 
“Creativity has long been a topic of interest to 
educators, artists, and historians of science. 
Until recently, however, it has not been a subject 
of serious study among cognitive scientists and 
experimental psychologists. It has been largely 
regarded as unresearchable, for two reasons” 
--- its unscientific connotations and 
experimentally unapproachable nature  
(Finke et al., 1992) 
The previous section presented some ideas about problem solving, but avoided 
treating it as creative behavior. However, it is common to see terms such as 
innovation, creativity, and so forth coupled with conceptual design. It would 
thus be a mistake not to address this connection in a review that considers this 
activity. Thus, the cognitive creativity research will be familiarized briefly. This 
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presentation is only a fragment of the creativity research (see Mayer, 1999; 
Mumford, 2003 for recent reviews). 
Psychological  theories of  creat ivi ty 
As quoted in the opening of this section, the creativity may appear as a too 
challenging target for scientific research. For that reason, in order to investigate 
it, it has become favorable to use a model of the creative process (Weisberg, 
1986) and decompose the process to independent parts, which are then studied 
separately with psychological methods. There are some psychological theories 
of creativity that have been experimentally tested (Runco & Sakamoto, 1999). 
The first two suggestions, RAT (Mednick, 1962) and SIAM (Nijstad, 2000), are 
comparable to the knowledge-based methods discussed in the problem-solving 
section. More specifically, they assume that new ideas are based on novel 
combinations of existing knowledge and generated by the common cognitive 
structures. They also emphasize the role of LTM associations as the controllers 
of creative behavior. Their contribution is the idea that simple properties of a 
cognitive structure can explain differences in a complex behavior. 
GenePlore model  
There has been recently an effort called Creative cognition, which has studied 
creativity with the methods of cognitive science. Its main product is a model of 
creativity called the GenePlore model. GenePlore describes creativity as a 
process with two phases: generative and explorative. The generative phase is 
described as being the source of mental representations of an idea. Several types 
of mental representation are possible, but the GenePlore mainly relies on special 
“preinventive structures”, which are an abstract class made of several different 
types of mental representations. Exploration is a process that interprets and 
examines preinventive structures to see how they fit the posed problem. 
Exploration can lead to a new cycle of preinventive structure generation, until 
the task constraints are satisfied and the final creative structure has been 
generated. The model includes several processes and structures that have been 
presented in the psychological literature, for instance, analogical reasoning, 
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categorical reduction, and conceptual synthesis. Another finding within the 
Creative cognition framework is a phenomenon called “structured imagination”, 
which refers to structural tendencies found in creative production experiments. 
The idea of structured imagination is that previously acquired knowledge tends 
to guide imagination in a predictable way. (Finke et al., 1992) 
The main lesson from GenePlore is that creative work proceeds in discreet 
phases and cycles. Several different processes and types of representation may 
contribute to a final product. Therefore, the forecoming model of design 
cognition should be compatible with the GenePlore framework and in a similar 
fashion, connectable to a multitude of cognitive processes that support creative 
work. 
Design research 
The engineer’s main task is to apply his scientific 
knowledge to the solution of technical problems and 
then to optimize that solution within the given 
material, technological and economical constraints. 
(Pahl & Beitz, 1984) 
Design is an act that engages a designer, or a design team, and requires a 
considerable effort in time and money. The above quotation gives a purpose for 
investigating design as engineering is built on knowledge. The definition could 
be extended by saying that design is about the development of artifacts and 
services for a purpose. This would better capture the idea of design as a 
profession (see Ulrich & Eppinger, 2003). However, there is no single design 
discipline, but instead several (see Figure 1) and major disciplines break up into 
specialties such as environmental architecture or mechanical engineering 
(Schön, 1995). Some believe that design in its varieties can be studied as a 
single subject (Goel, 1995). However, the different design disciplines are 
somewhat remote and this thesis focuses particularly on product design that is a 
central activity in both mechanical engineering and industrial design. 
 Lassi A Liikkanen Exploring problem decomposition 25  
Propositions from the other fields of design will be considered, but the cognitive 
model of conceptual design under preparation will be about conceptual design 
of products and not on generic design. 
Design process 
The development of products is commonly portrayed as a design process. The 
design process can be conceptualized in many ways. One of the most common 
lines of attack is to present it with cascading, waterfall models that display the 
development process from the start towards the end. They take the perspective 
of either an organization or of a developer. One developer-centered formulation 
is presented in Figure 4 and an alternative, organization-centered can be found 
from a textbook by Ulrich & Eppinger (2003, figure 1-4). 
Figure 4. The phases of product design process according to Pahl and Beitz (1984). 
Phases are not discreet, but overlapping possibly to even greater extent than what is 
shown in the figure. 
Of the several phases, the current interest is in the conceptual design phase, 
sometimes called concept design or concept development. It has the greatest 
effect on the cost and quality of the final product. It generates product concepts 
that are sort of prototype products, which are to be used as models in the 
following phases of the design process. A product concept is an unrefined idea 
that lacks details of construction materials, exact dimensions, price, and so forth. 
The usual presentation format for concepts is visual, possibly accompanied with 
corrective text passages. (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2003) 
Concept design is not an indivisible chunk; it can also be analyzed into 
individual phases. This is illustrated in Figure 5. From the designer’s point of 
view, the work begins from identifying essential problems based on a general 
specification of the product. As the problems have been clarified, the designer(s) 
should decompose the problem to establish a function structure for the product 
 
1. Planning 2. Conceptual 
design 
3. Embodiment design 4. Detail design 
Time ? 
 Lassi A Liikkanen Exploring problem decomposition 26  
(Pahl & Beitz, 1984). Next, solution principles are sought for each subfunction 
included in the function structure. The search for solution principles requires 
that the designer can create novel solutions based on her previous knowledge 
and external sources. This emphasizes the fact that the search has both an 
internal and an external component (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2003). After generating 
the principles, they are combined and the combination the product concept is 
evaluated (Pahl & Beitz, 1984). 
Figure 5. The phases of conceptual design process aligned in time as presented by 
Pahl and Beitz (1984). 
 
Although the main objective is to find a product concept, several ideas should 
be explored to discover all alternative possibilities. The invention of a good 
solution is essential for a successful design, as it has been shown that initially 
selected concepts are rarely abandoned, instead they are refined and modified 
even if they prove problematic (Cross, 2004). A general description of the 
design process has been now provided. A more detailed account can be found 
from the textbooks (e.g. Pahl & Beitz, 1984; Ulrich & Eppinger, 2003). The 
following subsection will consider how an internal search could be realized in a 
cognitive structure. For this purpose, a framework of design as problem solving 
will be presented. 
Design as problem solving 
Both psychologists and designers regard design as problem-solving (Goel, 1994; 
Pahl & Beitz, 1984; Simon, 1996).This section presents a cognitive problem-
solving model of the internal search phase in conceptual design. For this 
purpose, the relevant texts will be referenced. The description will remain on a 
textual level, even though some authors have proposed an algorithmic 
presentation format (see Ball et al., 1994; Jeffries et al., 1981). In this study, 
design problem solving will be discussed from the perspective of “generic 
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design” (Goel, 1995), to include cognitive theories about several design 
disciplines. 
The problem-solving view of design has been developed by independent authors 
working in different design domains. Thus, no coherent and detailed design 
theory exists yet, although several approximations have been presented (Akin, 
1986; Simon, 1996; Smith & Browne, 1993). During the last few decades, 
design research has been balancing between artificial intelligence and 
psychological models of design (Chandrasekaran, 1990), partially at the expense 
of the latter. This means that there has been more interest in developing 
computer-aided design (CAD) systems6 and designing AI to facilitate the design 
work than in understanding the cognitive processes of human designers.  
Background 
Most cognitive design theories are based on experimental work. However, all 
researchers that use an experimental psychological method must exclude some 
variables in order to control their experiments. Often one such variable is the 
effect of group work (social context) on idea generation. Group work during 
concept development is considered to be a normal practice in industrial 
environments. Group dynamics are one of the primary areas of interest in social 
psychology whereas cognitive psychologists, and this work, concentrate more 
on cognitive processes of an individual. Even though group experiments might 
be ecologically more valid, many researchers make use of individual subjects 
(Potter & Balthazard, 2004). This can be justified by arguing that “…ultimately, 
the foundation of any group’s productivity is the thinking of its individual 
members” (Potter & Balthazard, 2004). Also, it has been shown that designers 
who work alone or in pairs produce are more productive than groups (Diehl & 
                                                 
6 The term CAD is used in this work in a broad sense to refer to all computer systems that can be 
used in design. 
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Stroebe, 1987), so it is assumed that experimenting with individual subjects is a 
sufficient method. 
The problem-solving theories that will be discussed concern the cognitive 
processes, but they must consider knowledge representation as well. It is 
impossible to design a nuclear plant, an oil tanker, or a computer processor 
without a massive amount of knowledge. The psychological literature contains 
several ideas on knowledge representation (see section 2.2). Cognitive design 
research has not yet made significant advances in this area compared to the 
work involving CAD and design AI. However, a few propositions exist. 
It has been proposed that design knowledge is stored as design prototypes, i.e. 
schemata, which contain assorted, but mostly declarative, knowledge (Gero, 
1990). It should be noted that the term schema is also used to describe the 
control structures that guide design problem solving and consist of procedural 
knowledge. It is must hence be assumed that schemata of a varying abstraction 
level exist to support different types of problem-solving tasks (Ball et al., 1994). 
Possibly the most extensive discussion on the subject was provided by Akin 
(Akin, 1986), who considered several knowledge types in design context. This 
work will follow the approach taken by Ball and associates, and will use 
schemata and declarative knowledge as components of a design cognition 
model. The model of declarative knowledge is the one adapted from LT-WM 
theory (see section 2.2). According to this model, complete designs or product 
concepts are blends of some particular subsolutions, but have their own identity, 
such as the Tequila Sunrise. 
Problem interpretat ion 
The design process begins with the interpretation of the problem. This part is 
sometimes called establishing a problem space, forming a mental problem 
representation of the problem. This process is poorly defined in the 
psychological models of design. It is still an absolute necessity for all problem-
solving models. This is because problem-solving methods require a problem 
representation, which presents the main problem decomposed into manageable 
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subproblems (Smith & Browne, 1993) (Ball & Ormerod, 1995). So for now it 
must only be assumed that the designer somehow interprets the task assignment 
and understands what the main objective is. This process should definitely be 
clarified in the future.  
Recognit ion 
Problems can be solved immediately after the interpretation of the problem by 
recognizing a suitable solution. The problem-solving literature has established 
the concept of a (direct) recognition method, which refers to the instant retrieval 
of a solution after the problem interpretation (Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Klahr & 
Simon, 1999; Newell & Simon, 1972). This means that recognition is a very 
simple memory-based operation that can solve problems. Recognition is used 
often in design, as will be argued later on. Recognition works by matching a 
problem to the solution database and succeeds if an adequate match is found. 
Details of this mechanism are not considered here (see Anderson, 1983; Klahr & 
Simon, 1999)7. 
The application of recognition is restricted; it works well only for constrained 
problems that have a good match between the problem and the solution. Other 
methods are therefore required for resolving the problem. Control structures and 
solution search methods will thus be considered. However, the main problem 
must be divided first as the control structures work on several subgoals. 
Decomposition is therefore needed. 
Decomposit ion 
Decomposition is a weak method that also designers use to cope with the 
complexity of ill structured problems (Simon, 1996). Decomposition is present 
in the design literature in many ways. The conceptual design itself is a product 
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of decomposing the design process to the more manageable subproblems of 
conceptual development and detail design. Several decomposition methods are 
also a part of the normative design theory. The educational literature puts most 
emphasis on functional decomposition that provides a basis for other design 
theories and methods (Pahl & Beitz, 1984) (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2003). 
Functional decomposition begins with a “black box” (simplified) representation 
of the main function, which is then divided into several subfunctions. There is 
usually no single right decomposition for a device. Two additional methods are 
also mentioned: decomposition by sequence of user actions can be used with 
simple technical functions that involve a considerable amount of user 
interaction. Decomposition by customer needs is applicable when user 
requirements are critical for the product (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2003). No 
empirical studies were found concerning the prevalence or effectiveness of these 
methods. However, these methods should have an impact on designers because 
the methods are a part of their formal education. From a psychological 
perspective, all techniques seem equal in terms of output - one problem is 
transformed into a group of others through a deliberate act. 
Despite the remarkable presence of decomposition in design it is a fairly 
neglected topic in the psychology of design. This gap has also been noted in the 
literature (Akin, 1986; Ho, 2001), and the existence of this gap may reflect one 
“assumption of rationality” of design sciences (cf. Schön, 1995). In comparison, 
in computer sciences, and in the development of CAD tools, decomposition is 
                                                                                                                                   
7 The term recognition is also used in cognitive psychology to signify a particular type of task in 
cognitive memory research (see Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1992). In this work, they are 
considered to be unrelated, although this may be debatable. 
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still a timely topic8. However, decomposition or a functionally similar process is 
mentioned in most psychological conceptualizations of design. Authors use 
labels such as analysis (Schön, 1995), factorization (Newell & Simon, 1972), 
partitioning (Gero & McNeill, 1998), structuring (Goel & Pirolli, 1992), 
successive refinement (Anderson, 1983), chunking (Akin, 1986), break-down 
(Pahl & Beitz, 1984), or occasionally decomposition (Smith & Browne, 1993) 
when referring to this procedure. Sometimes it is considered to be a part of 
problem interpretation and not a separate process (Simon, 1996). This shows 
that the concept clearly is ill-defined. 
What is known about decomposition is that it is a domain-independent tool for 
splitting problems into a set of more manageable ones. The rationale is that 
decomposition reduces problem complexity by limiting the problem space, i.e. 
ruling out some portions of the whole, so there is smaller space to start with 
(Simon, 1996). Decomposition makes the assumption that the problem can be 
solved in independent or semi-independent parts, i.e. it is decomposable. This 
may not be always the case. For example, you can complete a jigsaw by starting 
from the edges, but you cannot first read a book and then borrow it and return it 
to the library in one go. Even though this be an optimal solution (it would save 
you a visit), the order of the processes is fixed and thus cannot be decomposed. 
Simon talks about this property when referring to “nearly decomposable” design 
problems. Another formulation of the same property is to describe subproblems 
as “leaky modules.” It states that subproblems are loosely connected, so that the 
interconnectivity can be ignored when solving a single subproblem (Goel, 
1995).  
                                                 
8 In a database search of the ISI Web of Knowledge conducted on 12.8.2005, over fifty relevant 
articles were found with the keywords “sub-problem”, “decomposition” and “partitioning” in 
engineering and computer science journals published from 2004-2005, but none in 
psychological journals. 
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How does decomposition operate? Thus far, it has been assumed that 
decomposition is based on universal, global methods (Newell & Simon, 1972; 
Laird et al., 1986). However, some see decomposition more as the flipside of 
formerly learned solutions. When learning solutions, problem subgoal structures 
might also be acquired (Egan & Greeno, 1974). The studies of software design 
show that the experienced programmers produce more explicit, successful, and 
elaborated problem decompositions than the novice (Jeffries et al., 1981) (Ball 
& Ormerod, 1995). This demonstrates that experience has an effect on 
decomposition and that the effect is probably task-specific, even though the 
actual balance is unknown. Because decomposition seems to be a tool that can 
be learned and applied intentionally, this method could be called explicit 
decomposition. The adjective explicit is used to indicate that usually weak 
methods are automatic, non-conscious actions. However, it has been proposed 
that there could also operate an implicit form of problem decomposition (Ho, 
2001). The psychological mechanisms of decomposition are currently unknown. 
One possibility could be that decomposition is based on a partial recognition 
(retrieval) of a solution that does not solve the problem at hand, but provides an 
adequate functional structure. Alternatively the decomposition could be a 
product of inference based on the same information, which resembles the 
function of AI expert systems. 
As a result of decomposition, the problem solver possesses some subproblems 
that are referred to as a goal stack or tree, a fundamental list, or a problem 
agenda in cognitive models and a functional structure in design literature 
(Anderson, 1987; Ball et al., 1994; Egan & Greeno, 1974; Ho, 2001; Pahl & 
Beitz, 1984). The functional structure and the other propositions are very 
similar. Issues such as subgoal priorities and subgoal representation are 
considered in computational models, but are uninteresting for the current work 
(see Egan & Greeno, 1974). More important is the fact that subgoals, along with 
the main goal, must be maintained throughout the problem-solving process (Ball 
& Ormerod, 1995). The upkeep of the goal stack can pose a problem for the 
problem solver. Because it is assumed that the goal stack is stored either in STM 
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or in LTM, problem solving can be hindered due to their limitations. STM 
capacity is also required for actual problem-solving operations and its overload 
may result in forgetting some subgoals. The outcome will be same if LTM 
storage or recall fails (Anderson, 1983; Egan & Greeno, 1974). 
Control  structures 
Control structures administer how subproblems are solved. It is assumed that the 
control structures are very general cognitive processes or schemata and they 
apply strategies, which are also schemata, for performing different cognitive 
functions. Control strategies can be characterized by several criteria. First, there 
is a basic distinction between the top-down and the bottom-up strategies. The 
top-down method begins with a problem (an initial state), whereas the bottom-
up approach begins with a solution (a goal state). These modes are sometimes 
called the goal-driven (working-forward) and the data-driven (working-
backward) search modes (Anderson et al., 1981; Ball & Ormerod, 1995). It is 
generally agreed that design is a top-down controlled task, as it would be 
inconceivable to begin the search from a solution which is initially inexistent 
(Smith & Browne, 1993). Secondly, it has been considered whether solutions 
are developed using a depth-first or a breadth-first control strategy (Akin, 1986; 
Ball & Ormerod, 1995). The operation of these styles is depicted in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Two alternative control strategies for searching solutions. The figure 
shows a design problem consisting of three subproblems. The arrows present how a 
depth-first and a breadth-first strategy would proceed to solve the problem. 
 
Main 
problem 
Depth-first 
Breadth-first 
Subproblem 1 
Subproblem 2 
Subproblem 3 
Abstraction level of the solution ? 
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The breadth-first strategy portrays the normative model of design in which all 
the subproblems are solved at one level of abstraction before getting into a more 
detailed level. This supposedly most effectively avoids the problem of 
interconnectivity. The alternative schema is the depth-first search in which 
individual subproblems are deciphered to a detailed level before considering 
other subproblems. 
The question of how and when these strategies are actually applied has been 
empirically studied. The results from different design disciplines indicate that 
expert designers adopt controlled, top-down and breadth-first strategies whereas 
novices use more unprincipled, depth-first approaches. However, many 
investigations have shown that designers usually employ both strategies with 
some opportunistic deviations (Ball & Ormerod, 1995; Ho, 2001). In explaining 
related findings, Goel describes a limited-least-commitment strategy (LCM), 
which remarks that subsolutions may be developed to any level of detail and 
then be put on hold. LCM is thus similar to the depth-first strategy, but used by 
expert designers (Goel, 1995). This finding increases the uncertainty related to 
the notion of “generic design” as control strategies seem to differ between 
disciplines. 
In brief, the main purpose of control structures is to select which subgoal should 
be solved next and this is achieved with a control strategy, which is realized as a 
schema in human problem solvers. Actually, the control structures do not have 
to initiate a solution search for each subproblem - instead they may iterate the 
problem further. As decomposition is not limited to any detail level, the designer 
can become very specific on every nut and bolt on an oil tanker, as new 
subproblems can be decomposed over and over. To avoid infinite recursion 
during the process, a stopping-rule is required (Goel, 1995; Simon, 1996). After 
the solution search has generated some results, a decision-making process is 
required to assess the suitability of alternative designs. After having now stated 
that there is a need for such function I will deliberately ignore it, as it poses one 
more issue that cannot be considered in appropriate depth. 
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Solut ion search 
The general solution search methods of problem solving discussed in section 2.3 
can be applied to design problems with some modifications. For instance, the 
weak and strong methods are called analytical and knowledge-based strategies 
in design (Smith & Browne, 1993). They are both informed methods, and the 
uninformed generate-and-test (GAT) method has, to the author’s best 
knowledge, not been discussed in the design context. The reason is clear. Design 
problems are ill structured and they lack information about the operators are 
needed to generate solutions. Gaining information about the operators is an 
essential part of solving an ISP. Therefore, GAT is not possible with design 
problems. When the generate-and-test method is mentioned in the context of 
design problem solving, it simply refers to using existing knowledge to generate 
solutions (Akin, 1986). 
The weak methods in design have not been comprehensively investigated (cf. 
Smith & Browne, 1993). In the remotely related studies of scientific discovery, 
analogical mapping is considered to be one significant weak method that 
combines the analytical and knowledge-based method (Klahr & Simon, 1999). 
Preliminary studies show that analogical mapping is also used by designers 
(Ball et al., 2004). Strong, knowledge-based methods have received more 
attention. 
Looking up answers from LTM requires a memory search that can be 
characterized with some general memory model, such as SAM or MINERVA 
(Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1992) or a specialized one such as SIAM or CuPRIG 
(Nijstad, 2000; Perttula & Liikkanen, 2005). The related studies of creative 
cognition have successfully adopted some features of general memory models to 
explain retrieval (Finke et al., 1992). It is also possible that solutions are sought 
from EM instead of internal memory. This issue has been widely investigated 
and it has been shown that resorting to EM may have both positive and negative 
effects on a creative task such as conceptual design (Jansson & Smith, 1991; 
Nijstad et al., 2002). Referring to earlier discussion about decomposition, 
explicit decomposition should also be considered as a domain-dependent strong 
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method. Other strong procedural methods include idea generations methods 
such as Brainstorming, the Gallery method, and TRIZ (Ulrich & Eppinger, 
2003). These idea generation methods can work in different ways. They can 
usually be interpreted as ways to influence the memory search or provide new 
methods for manipulating retrieved ideas. This means that there are more like 
meta-level methods than direct methods. 
Cognitive model of conceptual design 
The given details about design problem solving together with the general 
problem-solving theory and the psychological conception of creativity form a 
working model of internal search in conceptual design. The model presented in 
Figure 7 begins with problem interpretation, immediately followed by a 
recognition attempt. If recognition fails, problem is implicitly decomposed and 
the process of solution search begins. The control strategies control this search 
process and apply weak and strong methods to modify and solve subproblems in 
a recursive manner. Typically subsolutions are found using recognition or 
memory search. In addition to design specific weak methods, domain-
independent weak methods are also available, like the aforementioned 
analogical mapping and explicit decomposition, and possibly others, such as 
conceptual combination (Costello & Keane, 2000) or idea generation methods 
(Shah et al., 2000). Using explicit decomposition will likely lead to a new cycle 
of solution search utilizing a new subgoal. Note that an evaluation process and 
stopping-rules are mandatory for controlling this recursion. 
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Solution search  Problem presentation 
 
 
Interpretation 
and 
representation 
Recognition 
Implicit 
decomposition
Solution 
search 
Evaluation 
Solution output 
Method selection 
Subgoal selection 
Recognition 
Memory search 
Idea generation methods 
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Analogical reasoning 
... 
Figure 7. A cognitive model of conceptual design. The main process is shown in the 
left column beginning from the top and details of solution search are on the right pane. 
Finally, after the produced idea has been evaluated, this process can lead to 
output of an idea. Output in this context means that a sketch is drawn or a 
description of a solution is written. It is likely that STM capacity limitations 
may force this output after some cycles of solution search because STM 
capacity is limited and it is impossible to store the intermediate results in LTM. 
Some parts of the process maybe automatic, for instance recognition and 
implicit decomposition, but most processes, such as the solution search 
methods, require conscious effort and should therefore be available for 
verbalization. This modular connectivity is similar to the GenePlore model 
(subsection 2.4). As the model has now been presented, it is time to consider 
how decomposition as a module in the model, could be empirically tested. 
Grounds for empirical study of decomposition 
This work addresses the role of problem decomposition in the solution search 
phase of the conceptual design. But how can decomposition be studied? The 
majority of studies that examine design cognition have relied upon think-aloud 
methods (Cross, 2004). The think-aloud method, together with video-assisted 
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observation, provides the most complete picture of cognitive activities during a 
demanding cognitive task (van Someren et al., 1994). Thus, these methods will 
also be used in this study. Protocol analysis, a sophisticated form of the think-
aloud method, requires a cognitive model of the activity under observation 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1984). The abstract model was already introduced, but to 
apply the method, assumptions about how decomposition works and how can it 
be found from a verbal protocol must be clarified. These suppositions are 
derived from two sources: the normative design literature and psychological 
studies. 
Based on the current review, there is only one similar study that has considered 
decomposition in conceptual design (Ho, 2001).The study conducted by Ho 
observed two designers in a conceptual design task. The author identified two 
decomposition strategies: an implicit strategy used by the novice and an explicit 
decomposition used by the expert. Implicit decomposition was inferred from the 
structured development of the concept and the lack of any explicit 
decomposition in the expert’s behavior. These results are in line with the 
presented model of conceptual design. However, as only two designers with 
different levels of experience participated, the results must be considered 
preliminary. 
There are a few corresponding design studies that have included decomposition 
in their framework, but have focused on how the control strategies and 
component processes operate. Empirical work concerning programmers has 
constantly demonstrated explicit decomposition (Ball & Ormerod, 1995). In an 
unpublished study (Ullman et al., 1986 reported in Ball et al., 1994) senior 
students of mechanical engineering were found to use structured design 
methods(breadth-first control structure), which implies the use of 
decomposition. In a recent think-aloud study, researchers attempted to directly 
identify some protocol segments as decomposition among other cognitive 
processes. Their results showed that explicit decomposition could be detected in 
an electrical engineering task (Gero & McNeill, 1998). 
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There have been some decomposition studies in the domain of well-structured 
problem solving, but they have mainly investigated effects of altering 
decomposition by experimental manipulation, instead of addressing 
decomposition directly, and hence they are not helpful for the current 
investigation (Egan & Greeno, 1974; Eysenck & Keane, 2000). The effect of 
explicit, instructed decomposition on ill structured (non-design) problem solving 
has been shown to be positive on another problem domain (Dennis et al., 1996), 
but these results do not reveal anything about the decomposition process. 
Therefore, the decomposition must be analyzed further. 
Theoretical basis 
This study is committed to investigate individual designer in a conceptual 
design task using verbal protocol analysis. To question the proposed method, it 
can be asked, is it compulsory to use a laborious method like protocol analysis 
or could decomposition be studied by other means? Consider a typical 
experimental setup. Concept sketches and brief descriptions are the usual output 
from conceptual design, usually several of them. Can decomposition be 
observed from these documents? If the concepts present a complete design, then 
it is impossible to make any conclusions about the process. Even if we have 
several alternative sketches, or the designer has structured the concept into 
discreet functional parts, comparable to a functional structure, this reveals 
nothing about the underlying process. The designer may have retrieved the 
concept as a whole and formed the functional structure as she sketched the 
constituent parts. The result of this recognition-based process will be 
indistinguishable from a decomposition-based process. Alternatively, the 
designer can deliberately decompose the sketches to follow the normative 
expectations of a proper design. Thus, it is unwarranted to study decomposition 
by inspecting the design documents and a more informative method, such as 
think-aloud, should be used. 
The area of study influences the data. Conceptual design by definition demands 
preliminary and unelaborated results, product concepts. Designers must 
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therefore adapt stopping-rules that will prevent them from getting too detailed in 
the work (Goel, 1995). This fact diminishes the difference we could hope to 
observe between depth- and breadth-first control strategies (e.g. Anderson et al., 
1981). That is, if the solution contains only a few levels of abstraction, it will be 
hard to make a difference between these two modes. This fact requires paying 
special attention to even small changes in the abstraction level of solution 
development for distinguishing these modes. 
What model of decomposition should be considered? Three alternative 
techniques from the design literature were introduced in the previous subsection, 
functional decomposition being the most prominent. The designer may have 
adopted one or more technique and apply it when necessary. While the 
alternative methods focus differently on the main problem, they all produce 
decompositions of some kind. In the current research, it is assumed that the type 
of decomposition is irrelevant. The cognitive models presented at the end of 
previous section described two essential steps in retrieving solutions: 
recognition and decomposition. The latter has an implicit and explicit form. 
Next, criteria how they can be detected from verbal protocols will be 
established. 
Recognit ion and decomposit ion 
Recognition is a method for generating complete solutions at once. If we allow 
the designer to take enough time, she should be able to retrieve and output an 
entire design by recognizing its fit. In that case, we would expect that she would 
do this in some ordered, piece by piece manner reflecting the internal 
knowledge structure. This is a direct result of the supposed memory 
organization: linking separate properties to a single concept that has a particular 
name or identity. It is also possible that this name, e.g. Tequila Sunrise, might 
be verbalized in the process. This makes up two ways to observe recognition: by 
explicitly naming a solution at the beginning and by the fast and determined 
development of a concept. For example, a subject in Ho’s study (Ho, 2001) 
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recognized a general solution and responded that the solution, at general level, 
was an answering machine.  
For decomposition, the best demonstration of decomposition would be an 
explicit decomposition of the problem. On that occasion, the designer would be 
expected to provide a description of the relevant subgoals or metacognitive 
reflections of this process. The most essential subgoals should be presented in a 
row, without interfering solution propositions. A criterion could be that, if the 
designer cannot create a working solution with the presented subgoals, then 
something essential is missing. A metacognitive reflection in this case means 
that the designer would state that she is performing decomposition, using some 
phrase. As mentioned, explicit decomposition is not temporally restricted. The 
process may begin with the recall of full solutions, i.e. starting recognition-
based, and continue by decomposition-based generation, and so this possibility 
must be also considered.  
There are some possibilities to detect implicit decomposition. They are mostly 
based on the logic that if a solution is not produced by recognition or with the 
aid of explicit decomposition, then it must be based on implicit decomposition. 
As this criterion seems to encompass almost everything, it must be restrained by 
requiring that a top-down control strategy must have been used to produce the 
solution, so the design episode is a structured work based on a functional 
structure. 
The difference between recognition- and decomposition-based processes could 
be possibly inferred by the time taken to produce results. As it necessarily takes 
more mental operations, and hence time, to decompose a problem, generate 
subsolutions, and recompose the solution than to retrieve a solution from LTM 
(see Mayer, 1992 on mental chronometry). A practical difficulty might rise from 
the fact that sketching requires considerable time that will compress the time 
effects of the cognitive activity. For that reason, this possibility will be 
disregarded in the current work. 
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There is a fourth possibility that might show in a conceptual design experiment. 
For a complex problem that has several subfunctions, it is possible that the 
designer completely misses the key idea of the task and takes a single 
subproblem as the general problem. While the following problem-solving steps 
may resemble problem solving based on a more correct interpretation, this 
option would probably shape the designed concepts remarkably. 
The criteria needed for the protocol analysis have been now provided and are 
summarized in Table 1. There are several possible limitations in the current 
approach, but discussion about those issues is placed to the concluding chapter. 
Table 1 
Operational criteria for detecting recognition and two kinds of decomposition from 
verbal protocols 
Recognition 
1. Concept identity statements 
2. Temporally proximate development of complete concepts 
3. Fast, structured concept development 
  
Explicit decomposition 
1. Metacognitive statements about decompositoin 
2. Temporally proximate goal structure statements 
  
Implicit decomposition 
1. Distinguishable top-down global control strategy 
2. Unsystematic subgoal statements 
3. All non-recognition based concept development 
 
 
Hypotheses 
The approach taken in this study is explorative. This investigation attempts to 
confirm the findings made by Ho (Ho, 2001), but there are some additional 
assumptions that can be made, as the background model is more detailed and the 
characteristics of the sample are known a priori (details are provided in Methods 
chapter). The participants are fairly experienced designers, and thus it is 
expected that both recognition and decomposition will be used and that the tasks 
will be easy to interpret correctly. The use of recognition is possible due to the 
relatively large knowledge base of a highly educated adult and decomposition 
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because of the formal education. It is also assumed that the chances to use 
recognition will make the task subjectively easier. 
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1) Subjects will comprehend the task in whole, no misinterpretation 
based designs 
2) A small number of concepts will be produced by recognition 
3) Amount of recognition correlates negatively with the perceived task 
difficulty 
Studies with practicing software designers have shown that control strategies 
change from opportunistic, bottom-up to breadth-first, top-down strategies as 
the designer gains more experience (Ball & Ormerod, 1995) and that mechanical 
engineers apply structured methods in the early stages of product development 
(Ullman et al., 1986 in Ball et al., 1994). It is therefore predicted that subjects of 
this study should design more in a top-down manner and would explicitly 
decompose the problem as they have learned and as has been previously 
demonstrated (Ho, 2001). In the rest of the cases, it is expected that implicit 
decomposition will be successful. In other words, it is anticipated that some sort 
of decomposition will always occur. 
4) More breadth-first than depth-first approach 
5) Explicit decomposition in the majority of subjects 
6) Implicit decomposition in all subjects 
3. Experimental method 
Sixteen subjects participated in a think-aloud experiment consisting of two 
twenty-minute design tasks. The experimental setup was designed to provide 
data for several research questions, of which only decomposition is considered 
in this work. Despite this fact, the experiment is still described in full detail and 
the reader is only reminded that many features of the experiment are not 
essential for studying decomposition. All the participants will be referred in the 
text as “she” or “her” regardless of the participant’s sex. 
Participants 
Senior students of mechanical engineering, who should be familiar with 
decomposition, were recruited for the study. The final sample was selected on 
the basis of ecological validity and convenience. The volunteers were sixteen (N 
= 16) predominantly male (Nmale = 15) student at Helsinki University of 
Technology. The mean age of the sample was 26.8 years (SD = 2.4 years). All 
the participants had completed design related studies having a mean of 137 
credits (SD = 42) of 180 required for Master’s degree and possessed some 
design working experience (M = 0.8 years, SD = 0.7 years). Everyone spoke 
Finnish fluently, even though three bilingual subjects were included in the 
sample. In exchange for their time, the participants were awarded a movie 
ticket. Expected rewards have been shown to significantly boost the productivity 
(e.g. Nijstad et al., 2003), and therefore, to motivate the subjects, they were 
informed that the best designer in each task would be awarded with an extra 
movie ticket. Before the experiment, all participants gave a written consent prior 
to their participation and were briefed regarding the purposes of the study. They 
were also informed about the ethical guidelines of research material usage. 
Procedure 
This study used a factorial within-subjects design. Each participant completed 
two conceptual design tasks, called Plant and Forest. These tasks had one 
independent manipulation, the existence of the examples. This variable 
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consisted of an examples and no-examples condition. The order of the tasks and 
manipulations was counter-balanced between subjects. This resulted in four 
different procedures, each shared by four subjects, although in this setup, one 
subject provided data for two conditions. Only the data from the no-examples 
condition is included in the current study. The study was sequenced to ten 
phases, which are listed in Table 2 and described in the following subsections. 
Table 2 
The order and durations of the briefs and tasks 
# Phase Time in minutes 
1. Introduction 5  
2. First questionnaire 2-3  
3. Talk-aloud example and practice task 3-4  
4. General brief 1 
5. Written brief for Task #1 1 
6. Task #1 and its evaluation 21-24  
7. Practice task continued 1-2  
8. Written brief for Task #2 1  
9. Task #2 and its evaluation 21-24  
10 Concluding questionnaire 2-3  
  Approximate total 1h 5 min 
 
Phases 
During the introduction subjects were informed about the general aims of the 
study and notified what sort of data would be recorded. They were also told how 
the experiment would proceed and how they would be rewarded. Participants 
filled in two questionnaires. The initial questionnaire documented subjects’ 
background information (age, sex, design experience etc.) and alertness before 
the test. The concluding questionnaire assessed the subjective experience and 
domain knowledge related to the tasks. Both questionnaires are included in 
Appendix A. 
The application of the think-aloud method for inexperienced subjects may be 
difficult. Hence, it is usually suggested to give the subjects an unrelated training 
task for practicing the talk-aloud (van Someren et al., 1994). 15-puzzle, a 
variation of 8-puzzle, was constructed for this purpose. The puzzle has been 
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used previously on several problem-solving studies see (e.g. O'Hara & Payne, 
1998). The puzzle is shown in Figure 8. 
1 2 3 4 
5 6 7 8 
9 10 11 12 
13 14 15  
Figure 8. 15-puzzle contains fifteen numbered tiles an empty block. The figure 
displays the goal state of the puzzle. The initial state of the puzzle is a random 
arrangement of tiles. The puzzle is solved by moving one tile a time to the empty 
block to reach the goal state. 
The practice was arranged so that the experimenter first turned on the video 
camera and then began to think-aloud while solving the puzzle. After a few 
moves, the task was transferred to the participant, who continued the task. While 
solving the puzzle, the experimenter constantly encouraged the participant to 
voice out her ongoing thoughts. After a couple of minutes, as the participant 
seemed to comprehend the talk-aloud method, the work on the puzzle was 
postponed and the next phase, general briefing, began. 
The task administration began with a spoken, general task description that 
covered both tasks (see appendix B). It enclosed the general aim of the 
conceptual design and stated the objectives of this experiment; the need for 
quantity and variety of idea production together with the deferred criticism of 
solutions. These guidelines are a modification of the Brainstorming principles 
(Osborn, 1957), although the reuse of previous ideas was not mentioned here. 
The intended presentation of a concept was defined as a sketch; a free hand 
drawing, supported by explanatory words. The subjects were earlier trained to 
think-aloud and were now encouraged to do so during the tasks. They were also 
told to refrain from elaborating their concepts and also to limit their textual 
descriptions to minimum. They were informed that the experimenter would not 
answer their questions during the task, and were therefore suggested to present 
their inquiries prior to tasks. After that, the subjects received answer sheets for 
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presenting concepts and the first task brief. When the first task was finished, the 
subjects continued to work on the puzzle for one or two minutes in order to wipe 
out the previous task from their short-term memory. 
Tasks 
Two novel and realistic design tasks were invented for the study, called Forest 
and Plant. The Forest task required a design of a tree trunk removal apparatus 
and the Plant task was about an automatic plant watering device. The tasks were 
designed to be equally challenging, but the possible difference of difficulty 
between two tasks should not be critical for a study of decomposition, as the 
previous design studies have even employed different tasks for each subjects 
participating in the same study (Ball et al., 1994; Goel & Pirolli, 1992). 
The task brief was presented to the subjects as a paper printed on both sides. The 
task description was on the first side and the manipulation on the reverse. The 
description (Appendix C) consisted of a short paragraph describing the current 
situation in the problem domain and the design assignment at a general level. 
The manipulation on the reverse side contained four example concepts in the 
examples condition and a schematic figure of the trunk or the plant in the no-
examples condition. The schematic figure was an extract from the example 
concepts (see Appendix C), but it is considered to be irrelevant for this study. 
Both task briefs were given in textual form to subjects and their comprehension 
was confirmed before starting the task. The time for reading the brief was 
unlimited. After reading, both tasks were allowed twenty minutes timed from 
the flipping of the brief pap and participants were informed approximately two 
minutes before the end about the remaining time. During the twenty minutes, 
subjects drew concepts on the given sheets, two concepts on a sheet. If 
necessary, the subject was requested to pile the finished concepts on her other 
side, so that they were not directly accessible during the task and that their 
possible later inspection and manipulation could be captured on the video. 
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The experimenter avoided interaction with the subjects. If subjects, despite the 
instruction, asked questions during the tasks, the experimenter either answered 
by quoting the task brief or the general task description. In other cases, he stated 
that he cannot answer the question. If the subject stopped verbalizing at some 
point the experimenter encouraged her to continue by saying, for instance, 
“please continue thinking aloud”, “what are you thinking”, or “what’s on your 
mind.” This is a standard procedure within the paradigm (Ericsson & Simon, 
1984). 
After completing a task, the subjects had to briefly evaluate their sketches on a 
scale from five to zero according to their “general quality and creativity” and to 
present some supporting arguments. No time limit was given for this procedure, 
but the experimenter encouraged the subjects to be prompt. During this phase, 
the subjects were also asked to clarify their sketches with text descriptions, if the 
experimenter could not otherwise identify the solution principles. 
Analysis of behavior 
This study applied the think-aloud method together with video observation for 
gathering data. Think-aloud is a method that has been used for over a century in 
psychological research (van Someren et al., 1994). Think-aloud produces verbal 
protocols that are analyzed to investigate processes behind the verbal behavior 
with a method called protocol analysis. Protocol analysis can be applied to the 
study of cognitive processes to gain information inaccessible with other 
behavioral methods. A more recent variant of the talk-aloud method is verbal 
analysis, which stresses more the knowledge structures than cognitive processes 
(Chi, 1997). Features of both methods were incorporated in the current 
exploratory experiment. Think-aloud can be applied in two ways, as concurrent 
or retrospective verbalizing. In general, concurrent verbalization is a more 
reliable data source than retrospective protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). 
Previous studies have not revealed significant differences between concurrent 
and retrospective protocols of design (Gero & Tang, 2001) and thus this study 
also used concurrent verbalizations. In addition to verbal protocols audio-video 
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recordings and sketches were used in this study in order to provide more correct 
interpretations of the designer’s cognitive activity. Verbal protocols alone 
provide a deficient data as designers habitually use indexical (or deictic) 
references (Dix et al., 2004). This makes it impossible to understand the design 
process by using only the audio recording as the targets of the reference are 
absent. 
Data preparat ion 
The experiments were captured on a MiniDV recorder. The recordings were 
then transferred to VideoCD format with high picture and sound quality (sound 
sampling rate 48 kHz). The transcription of verbal protocols from the videos 
was done using the Subcreator software and the resulting text files were 
imported into Excel spreadsheet with the aid of a VBS macro for coding the 
protocols. After this procedure, the data was exported back into text format. The 
codes were later summarized with scripts written in PHP scripting language. 
Eventually, all numerical data from the experiments were imported into SPSS 
statistics software for analysis. 
In addition to the transcribed protocols and video recordings, the product 
concept sketches were prepared for the analysis. Initially, concepts were simply 
calculated and numbered. This numbering is referred to concept identification 
number and it was later on joined with the protocols. While this should have 
been a simple operation, as the answer sheets were numbered beforehand, some 
exceptions occurred. All concepts drawn on the sheet were calculated without 
discarding any concepts. However, if the subject had drawn several concepts on 
a sheet that was deserved for a single concept, the ideas were calculated as 
separate concepts. 
Coding verbal protocols 
Coding schemes 
The segmentation and the coding of protocols are the two most significant parts 
of the analysis. Initially, several schemes were considered that were all partially 
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compatible with the cognitive model (Akin, 1986; Gero & McNeill, 1998; 
Kavakli & Gero, 2002; Suwa et al., 1998; Goel & Pirolli, 1992). Akin has 
explicitly described how control structures can be traced by using problem 
description graphs (a PDG, see Akin, 1986). A PDG contains a description of 
design abstraction levels that are also found in the works of Gero and associates. 
Eventually, a modified version of the coding scheme used by Gero and McNeill 
(1998) was selected in order to obtain a representation comparable to a problem 
description graph. It will be described next. 
Most of the aforementioned schemes have included codes for several cognitive 
processes, e.g. for proposing, analyzing, evaluating, and synthesizing solutions 
(Gero & Tang, 2001). As this study is about describing how designers 
decompose a problem it was seen unnecessary to denote the segments with a 
process code. Instead, a general decomposition code (DEC code) was included 
to mark segments that contain explicit decomposition. 
The coding was done in two phases. First general schemes were abstracted and 
then the protocols were coded using these schemes. A general problem 
decomposition scheme (PDS code) was abstracted for both tasks, corresponding 
to a functional decomposition of the main problem (see section 2.5). A PDS 
contains four abstraction levels: the main function, solution types, subfunctions 
and subfunction solution principles. For solution types, there are two options in 
relation to the task brief. The rationale is that most designers stick to the 
problem statement, but in a few designs, they disobey this constraint and 
propose qualitatively different solutions (see Table 3 below). Each device has 
several subfunctions, also called subgoals or subproblems where each 
subfunction can have several solution principles, some of which maybe shared 
between two subfunctions. 
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Table 3 
Problem decomposition schemes. This table includes only the main function, solution 
types, and subfunctions. Solution principles are omitted. The prefixed number is the 
PDS code 
 
 Plant 
Main function 0. Plant watering device 
Solution types 1. Devices attached to pot 
 2. Independent devices 
Subfunctions 3. Water supply 
 4. Regulation 
 5. Transfer 
 6. Mediator 
 7. Energy source 
Principles a 
  
 Forest 
Main function 0. Trunk disposal 
Solution types 1. Integrated devices 
 2. External devices 
Subfunctions 3. Destruction 
 4. Removal 
 5. Dispersal 
 6. Recovery 
 7. Attachment to machine 
 8. Mediating mechanisms 
Principles a 
Note  
a Principles are listed in the appendix 
 
The problem decomposition schemes were created using the protocols bottom-
up, so that all protocols and sketches were first inspected and generalized into 
one scheme that would encompass all solution variants (see van Someren et al., 
1994). All solution principles that were considered functionally relevant were 
included regardless of their commonality, i.e. observed frequency. The relation 
of some particle principles and subfunctions can be questioned, but it is 
indifferent for this study, as the main interest is in the abstraction level of the 
solution statements. Although it is likely that this generalized scheme will clash 
with some individual protocols, it was still considered to be a better option than 
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devising customized schemes for each designer (cf. Gero & McNeill, 1998). The 
general problem decomposition schemes are presented in Table 3 and the 
detailed versions of both schemes are available in Appendix D. 
The most important detail in the schemes is the difference between subfunctions 
and solutions. They present two levels of abstraction: immaterial subfunctions 
and concrete principles. Subfunctions are the functionalities that together 
compose the main function. It is assumed that they a correspond to the subgoals 
of the goal stack, which makes their existence an indirect indicator of 
decomposition. The solution principle codes, numbered from thirty to eighty, 
are listed in Appendix D. Their intention is to identify a particular solution 
adapted for a subproblem, e.g. an electronic timer for regulating water flow or a 
corkscrew for removing a trunk. These codes are not very specific; instead of 
nominating one very distinctive principle, they represent a solution category 
similar to radial categories discussed in 2.2. For instance, a water regulation 
solution called container degradation (number 48 for Plant) could refer to a 
degradation caused by water, sun, or oxygen. In coding the Forest task, the 
coding rules were relaxed so that if a solution principle code from another 
subfunction category could be used if it served the same function. For instance, 
a mechanism that destroys the trunk using a chemical was classified as number 
35, even though the designer had included a drill which would normally be 
classified as #41 or #56. As a consequence, this flexibility makes it more 
difficult to trace the control strategy, but keeps the PDS simpler. 
The schemes exclude some solution principles that were evaluated less 
significant, but were used by some subjects, usually related to the alternative 
solution type (PDS code # 2, Table 3). Also, the propositions that redefined the 
target (the plant or the trunk) or its immediate surroundings were ignored, as 
they were considered to be functionally indifferent. In the Forest task, designers 
sometimes decomposed a solution principle, which had been dedicated a single 
code, e.g. by stating that exploding a trunk was a three-staged process. In these 
cases, an appropriate code for each solution principle was selected, even though 
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this contradicts the basic rationale of the scheme it allowed to identify 
decomposition of a subproblem in this case. 
During the observations at the time of experiments and in the bottom-up 
analysis of the protocols, it appeared that the designers were very solution-
oriented. It was noted that the designer may never state a problem, but just 
introduces a solution. While this makes no problem for coding solution 
principles, it has an effect on subfunctions. It was hence acknowledged that a 
subfunction can be referred to in an enquiring voice or as a general solution 
statement. For instance, the designer of a trunk shredder could say “what could 
be the shredder like” or “and then we have some sort of a shredder” when 
referring to the same subfunction, the dispersal of the trunk. Therefore, the 
subfunctions presented as problems were coded with a question mark post-fixed 
to the PDS code. 
Coding rules 
A PDS was given to all segments that explicitly demonstrated idea development. 
If a segment contained several solution statements, the segment was split in two 
and PDS code was dedicated to each separately. If some solution detail seemed 
to serve several purposes, only the main function of the solution statement was 
considered and possible secondary functions were discarded e.g. a conveyer belt 
for plants was considered to be primarily a mean to move plants, rather than to 
regulate the transferred water. Segments that contained literal or semantic 
repetition were left out if they were temporally close, i.e. uttered during the 
development of a single concept (see Ericsson & Simon, 1984).This rule 
excludes also the cases where the subject had first vocalized an idea and then 
repeated it while drawing. However, if alternative principles falling into the 
same solution principle category were presented in a row, they were given 
separate PDS codes. In a situation, where the same principle was merely 
elaborated, e.g. the designer considered the water basin details very carefully, 
only a single code was used. 
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There were also segments that introduced new solution principles, but these 
principles were not implemented in any of the documented ideas. These 
segments were also included in the analysis normally, but their concept 
identification number was set to zero. Similarly, the identification numbers for 
the phrases that referred to earlier solutions, usually phrases about what had 
been done before, were also set zero. In practice, the zero was post fixed to the 
PDS code separated by a slash, e.g. 42/0. This procedure intends to identify the 
statements that advanced the design, and make it possible to trace the functional 
structure of each concept by selecting only those PDS coded segments that share 
the same identification number. 
There were situations where the protocol was clearly incomplete or 
incomprehensible. On some occasions, a designer drew a whole concept or 
some solution principles without any verbal, spoken or written, reference. These 
design suggestions were called implicit segments and they were added to the 
transcribed protocol with the implicit PDS code after the last explicit segment of 
the concept-in-preparation and before the first segment of the following concept. 
To minimize false interpretations, implicit segments were identified by their 
main principle and all possible forms of elaboration were discarded. Also 
situations where a designer had jotted down a principle instead of a sketch 
occurred. They were inserted to the verbal protocol as implicit segments and 
given an appropriated PDS code. To sum up, all written and spoken design ideas 
were coded once with an explicit PDS code and ideas in figural form only were 
coded with an implicit PDS code. 
Coding 
The coding of the sixteen protocols was done after the transcriptions had been 
converted to a table format. In the table, each transcribed segment had a time 
code and four additional columns for the concept number, decomposition code, 
and explicit and implicit PDS codes. The details about each code will be 
provided next. 
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At the start, concept numbers were initialized by marking all segments with 
zero. Then the first segment clearly associated to a drawn concept was identified 
and the corresponding number was assigned to it. This segment was called 
‘concept initiating segment’. This was done for all concepts. After identifying 
all concept initiating segments, all segments between the two initiating segments 
where numbered with the number of the former segment. 
Next, the explicit decomposition code (DEC), was determined. It had a Boolean 
value of 1 or 0 (true or false). As stated in section 2.6, for a positive DEC, the 
subject was required to state that she is partitioning the problem. The actual 
phrase could differ, but it was required to semantically match the idea of 
decomposition. These segments and the neighboring segments that were clearly 
associated with explicit decomposition were coded as true, others false. 
In the following phase, segments that contained references to a solution type, to 
a solution principle, or a statement of the problem, were coded with a PDS code. 
In these segments, the subject introduced a solution, reconsidered it, or 
presented a problem formulation or an objective. Coding was done with the aid 
of sketches and video recordings. Based on the differences between verbal 
protocols and documented ideas, implicit solutions were also PDS coded. The 
implicit PDS code(s) was added to the dedicated column of the last segment of 
the concept in development. If there were no segments, or an insufficient 
number of segments, a new segment was added with the time code of the 
following segment. After inserting all PDS codes, all remaining segments 
without any PDS or DEC code were discarded from analysis. The PDS coding 
was carried out twice order by the author to minimize interpretation errors. After 
the coding, all coded protocols were checked thrice for overall coherence. The 
full, segmented, coded protocols are available in Appendix E in the original 
language. 
During the last phase of the coding process, the PDS codes were used to infer 
the control strategy used during the development of each design idea. First, 
some ideas were identified as recognition-based and were thus skipped, as a 
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control strategy was not needed in those cases. If concept development began 
with a recognition-based idea, but the idea was refined, it was still coded as 
recognition-based. Then the breadth-first and depth-first strategies were 
distinguished by inspecting what sort of segments made up the solution (Ball et 
al., 1994). This was relatively easy, as the PDS codes already contained 
information about the abstraction level, bigger number enumerating a more 
specific and a smaller number a more abstract level (see Appendix D). A 
breadth-first strategy was detected when a subject presented solutions to all 
relevant subproblems at the same level of abstraction, e.g. a solution consisted 
of PDS codes 30, 40, and 50. If a documented idea contained solution(s) to only 
one subproblem, then it was considered to be depth-first, e.g. PDS code 30, or 
30 and 31. Some might argue that if several depth-first solutions were presented 
in a row as separate ideas, then this would indicate a breadth-first schema. For 
instance, PDS codes 30, 40, and 50. However, it was considered that designer’s 
decision to sketch solutions separately is more determining than the temporal 
sequence in this case. Some concepts could not be classified to neither of the 
categories mentioned above. Although these concepts might be labeled as 
“opportunistic” (Ball & Ormerod, 1995), the term ‘mixed strategy’ is used here. 
A concept produced by a mixed strategy could be for example: 30,40,5,60,7. A 
mixture could result from leaving out subsolutions, presenting only a single 
solution principle, but referring to other subproblems. Identified control 
strategies, CS coding, were gathered to a separate table (Appendix F). 
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The final step was to inspect the PDS coded segments for temporal patterns, 
because it was assumed that explicit decomposition could occur without any 
particular verbal report. The criterion for explicit decomposition was that the 
essential subfunctions must be mentioned in a row, e.g. 3, 4, and 5. If explicit 
decomposition was found, these segments were marked with the positive DEC 
code. An example of the application of the presented coding scheme is 
displayed in Table 4 below. 
Table 4 
A real, translated extract from the complete coded protocol of the subject number 
thirteen. The extract displays twenty seconds and seven last segments of her protocol 
that contained total 227 segments. Four segments have been coded, two non-
implemented, one implemented and one implicit. 
Time Concept # DEC 
Explicit 
PDS 
Implicit 
PDS Segment 
0:19:20 14 0 how about electricity - could electricity 
0:19:31 14 0 48/0 it would likely cut or  
0:19:33 14 0 31/0 burn it somehow 
0:19:37 14 0 if the trunk is wet enough it would conduct 
0:19:40 14 0 electricity, so er... 
0:19:42 14 0 37 electricity burns it down, 
0:19:43 14 0  70 a proper lightning 
 
 
4. Results 
This chapter presents results from the sixteen experiments. In each experiment, 
one participant completed two tasks, one with example concepts and one 
without. Only the data from the no-examples condition has been analyzed. 
Subjects who completed the Plant task make up the Plant group and those who 
did the corresponding Forest task are referred to as the Forest group. First, a 
general overview about the results is given and then the measures related to the 
hypotheses will be evaluated. 
Overview 
There are several measures that can be used to assess the produced concepts 
(Shah et al., 2003), but in this experiment only the quantity of ideas was 
considered necessary. The sixteen subjects produced eighty five concepts in the 
Forest task (N = 85) and seventy one concepts in the Plant task (N = 71), a total 
of one hundred and fifty six concepts (N = 156). There was a considerable 
variation between subjects (M = 9.8, SD = 3.6 concepts). As all subjects 
produced at least some concepts, all data were included in the analysis. The 
produced concepts varied also qualitatively. The amount of textual descriptions 
attached to the concepts greatly differed, as did the detail level of sketches. 
Some subjects produced just visual ideas and a few produced a concept in plain 
text. Most subjects visualized the target, the trunk or the plant, but some skipped 
it. These examples give an idea of how diverse the design idea generation 
process is, for instance, in comparison to the Electronic Brainstorming studies, 
in which the produced ideas are strictly formatted (e.g. Nijstad et al., 2002) 
The verbal protocols were first examined quantitatively. The number of words 
per protocol varied considerably between all subjects (M = 869.9, SD = 378.6 
words), which was anticipated as the participants were not chosen by their 
verbal fluency. From the protocols, over two hundred segments were detected 
on average, but this also varied a great deal (M = 212.4, SD = 72.3 segments). 
As all subjects verbalized thoughts about the majority of their concepts and 
video recordings facilitated the analysis, segments could be reliably associated 
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with the sketched ideas and numbered, as described in section 3.4. It was also 
noted that designers discussed their work chiefly through solutions. Problems, 
the main problem or some of the subproblems, were typically mentioned only 
once by each designer (M = 1.4, SD = 1.4 segments). This emphasizes the fact 
that subproblems or subfunctions were more often discussed as generic solutions 
than specific subproblems (M = 3.6, SD = 2.6 segments), e.g. stating that “we 
have water supply” instead of saying “where could we get water”. Thus, the 
designers could be described as solution-oriented. 
It was assumed that the tasks should be equally challenging, and consequently, 
produce quantitatively similar results. This seems to be correct. Considering the 
perceived difficulty based on the answers to the concluding questionnaire (Table 
5), tasks were quite balanced and neither task environment was completely 
foreign to the designers. The median class for familiarity with the problem was 
“little” in both tasks. The majority of subjects felt that the Forest task was more 
demanding than Plant (N = 9), some thought the opposite (N = 6), and a single 
person estimated the tasks equally challenging9. Comparing the number of 
documented ideas, more concepts were produced for Forest than Plant (MForest = 
10.6, SDForest = 4.5 and MPlant = 8.9, SDPlant = 2.2). To statistically test this 
finding, normality was first assumed and the variances were tested for inequality 
(F(7,7) = 3.66, p > .05). However, the difference of means was not statistically 
significant, T(7) = 1.10, p > .10 and therefore, the difficulty of the tasks is equal. 
                                                 
9 This result is only possible because each subject completed both tasks. Unfortunately it is 
impossible to evaluate how examples affected the other task because of the small number of 
subjects and the experimental design. 
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Table 5 
Frequencies of the selected results from the concluding questionnaire. Two tasks are 
grouped separately in the first item, but aggregated in the second 
Familiarity with the task environment     
  Not at all Little Some what Very much 
Plant ( n = 8) 2 3 0 3 
Forest (n = 8) 1 6 1 0 
     
Perceived difficult Plant Forest Equal Can not say 
Which task was more 
difficult  (n=16) 6 9 1 0 
 
The first step in compiling the results from the protocol analyses was to 
summarize the problem decomposition scheme (PDS) codes. A summary of 
PDS codes is presented in Table 6. The classification of code types is based on 
two PDS:s and the specification given in section 3.4. 
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Table 6 
Summaries of PDS the coded segments per subject and over all subjects. The upper table 
contains the total number of PDS codes and their relative amounts. The table below 
specifies the frequency distribution of PDS coded segments in the PDS category Other 
 N of PDS   Proportions   
Subject  segments 
Explicit 
principles 
Implicit
principles Other   
1 31 65 % 3 % 32 %   
2 30 57 % 13 % 30 %   
3 30 43 % 0 % 57 %   
4 36 61 % 8 % 31 %   
5 16 38 % 6 % 56 %   
6 39 72 % 18 % 10 %   
7 32 22 % 59 % 19 %   
8 35 69 % 3 % 29 %   
9 29 83 % 7 % 10 %   
10 47 81 % 0 % 19 %   
11 41 44 % 20 % 37 %   
12 30 47 % 13 % 40 %   
13 47 47 % 17 % 36 %   
14 27 85 % 7 % 7 %   
15 16 44 % 19 % 38 %   
16 31 26 % 10 % 65 %   
       
M 32,3 55 % 13 % 32 %   
SD 8,8 20 % 9 % 10 %   
       
  N of Other PDS segments (all explicit)      
Subject Total 
Main 
functions 
Solution 
types 
Subfunction 
problems 
Subfunction 
solutions Principles 
1 8 1 0 3 2 2 
2 9 0 2 1 2 4 
3 17 0 0 0 9 8 
4 11 0 2 2 2 5 
5 9 0 0 0 9 0 
6 4 0 0 1 2 1 
7 6 0 0 2 2 2 
8 10 0 3 0 2 5 
9 3 0 0 0 2 1 
10 9 0 1 1 3 4 
11 15 0 0 2 6 7 
12 12 0 1 0 2 9 
13 17 0 0 4 6 7 
14 2 0 1 0 0 1 
15 6 0 1 1 4 0 
16 20 0 3 2 4 11 
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The left column of Table 6 presents the number of explicit segments (solution 
principles in PDS) that were mentioned in the verbal protocol and implemented 
in the sketches. These make up a little more than a half of all PDS coded 
segments. Some solution principles, or parts of them, were identified from the 
sketches only. These parts are listed as implicit segments. Both explicit and 
implicit segments made additions to the design. Segments coded with an explicit 
PDS, but not considering any solution principle and therefore not advancing the 
idea, belong to the ‘Other’ category.. 
There was a considerable variance in the PDS code proportions categories 
between subjects (see Table 6). One reason for this is that some subjects (e.g. 
subject. #7 and #11) have produced notably more implicit segments than the 
others. Differences can be also understood by examining the lower portion of 
the table, where Other-category segments have been presented in more detail. 
Other principles are segments that evaluate, reconsider, or consider previously 
implemented or abandoned solution principles. It seems that some designers, for 
instance subjects #3, #12, and #16, analyzed their work more than the others 
based on the high proportion Other principles. Subfunctions make up two 
groups. Segments that stated a subfunction as a problem, e.g. “how can we dig 
up the trunk”, are called Other subfunction problems, but if these subfunctions 
were stated as general subfunctions “the trunk is dig up”, then segments belong 
to the category Other subfunction solutions. The few references to solution types 
are contained in Other solution types category. This includes very general 
references, for example, “it is an independent machine”, “it’s a …device in the 
pot”, or “there comes an airplane.” It makes no difference whether the solution 
type was implemented or just mentioned. Finally, in the single when the main 
goal of the task was mentioned, it was placed to the Other main function 
category. 
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Specific findings 
Results specific to hypotheses of this study have been gathered to Tables 7 and 
8. The latter presents findings about the main experimental question and the 
former summarizes results about the control strategies, which will be considered 
first. 
Table 7 
Summaries of the control strategies used by the subjects. The columns display 
the total number of concepts and which strategies that were used to produce 
those them. Below the individual results are the mean proportions for the two 
groups and at the bottom of the table summarizes the strategic orientation 
defined as the mode class of strategies per group 
Subject 
Total N of 
concepts Recognition Depth-first
Breadth-
first Mixed 
1 16 0 % 75 % 19 % 6 % 
2 9 0 % 11 % 67 % 22 % 
3 10 0 % 90 % 0 % 10 % 
4 9 0 % 0 % 78 % 22 % 
5 3 0 % 0 % 100 % 0 % 
6 13 0 % 8 % 92 % 0 % 
7 13 0 % 69 % 0 % 31 % 
8 7 14 % 0 % 86 % 0 % 
9 10 0 % 10 % 30 % 60 % 
10 11 0 % 0 % 91 % 9 % 
11 13 0 % 46 % 23 % 31 % 
12 6 17 % 17 % 67 % 0 % 
13 14 0 % 0 % 14 % 86 % 
14 8 13 % 13 % 75 % 0 % 
15 5 0 % 0 % 20 % 80 % 
16 8 25 % 13 % 13 % 50 % 
Overall M 10.5 4 % 22 % 48 % 25 % 
Plant group 71 8.6 % 7.6 % 70.9 % 12.9 % 
Forest group 85 0.0 % 36.3 % 25.8 % 37.9 % 
           
Strategic orientation of subjects     
Plant group (n = 8)  0 % 0 % 88 % 12 % 
Forest group (n = 
8)  0 % 50 % 12 % 38 % 
 
Control  strategies 
All subjects seemed to have understood the task as a whole. Nobody 
concentrated on a single subfunction during the experiment and thus no 
misinterpretation-based designs were found. In general, most concepts were 
produced using a structured top-down, breadth-first or depth-first, strategy (70% 
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of 168 concepts total). The majority of these concepts were generated using the 
breadth-first strategy (43% of all concepts), but sometimes a depth-first strategy 
was also used (27%). There was still a considerable amount of non-structured 
approaches, which were classified as mixed strategies (26%), but might also be 
called opportunistic strategies. Recognition played a minor role, as only five 
instances were detected (4%). While the small number of these incidents makes 
it unpractical to statistically evaluate the relation of perceived difficulty and 
recognition, it should be mentioned that three of four subjects, who had used 
recognition in the Plant task, also found that task easier. Subfunctions were not 
solved in any particular order. Those subjects, who mainly used the breadth-first 
strategy, did not show any constant pattern in selecting subgoals, instead they 
started new ideas from a random subgoal. This was not analyzed in further 
detail. 
For control strategies, there was a considerable difference between the tasks, 
especially in the proportions of the breadth-first and the mixed strategy. In Plant, 
the bulk of concepts where created breadth-first (71%, N = 71), but in Forest this 
figure sank to a third (26%, N = 97) and the proportion of the depth-first strategy 
increased from 8% to 36% (N = 97). The number of mixed strategies was also 
greater in Forest (13% vs. 39%). The difference in control strategy distributions 
between the tasks is significant, χ2 (3, N = 155) = 62.06, p <= .0001. This 
difference shows also in the subject orientation, which was determined as the 
mode class of the control strategies applied per subject (see Table 7). The most 
typical orientation in Plant was breadth-first (88%, N = 8), but in Forest, the 
mixed strategy was almost as popular as the depth-first strategy (38% vs. 50%, 
N = 8). 
Decomposit ion 
Several criteria for detecting the different forms of decomposition were set in 
section 2.6 and they were applied as described in section 3.4. The results from 
that inspection are presented in Table 8. Explicit decomposition was observed 
only in three cases (N = 3). Two instances were identified by the use of a verb 
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(subjects #10 and #11) and one by the temporal sequence of subgoal 
presentation (subject #3). Concerning the tasks, explicit decomposition was 
detected twice in Forest and once in Plant. Examining the results of explicit 
decomposition in terms of presented subgoals (subfunctions), it appears that 
only a single subject verbalized a goal stack covering all essential subgoals. The 
normative theories state that decomposition should be carried out before 
generating ideas. However, of the three designers, only one behaved in this way 
(subject #10). 
Table 8 
Frequencies of the different forms of decomposition as detected from the protocols. 
Each subject who at least once was used a particular type of decomposition has been 
included 
Design approach 
Observed in number 
of subjects 
Explicit decomposition 3
  Of which 
  -- Complete explicit decomposition 1
  -- Explicit decomposition at the onset of the task 1
 
Implicit decomposition only 13
Total 16
 
As described earlier, all subjects used top-down control strategies to some 
extent. Inferring from the structured development of concepts, it was evident 
that the rest of the subjects had applied implicit decomposition (N = 13). Also, 
there were some subfunctions that were rarely considered, such as the energy 
source and the mediator in Plant, and the recovery and the attachment in Forest. 
This finding supports the view that each task has a set of essential subgoals and 
these goals have an effect on the problem-solving behavior. As the results have 
now been presented, it must be considered what they tell about the cognitive 
model in general and problem decomposition in particular. 
5. Discussion 
This study investigated the role of problem decomposition in the internal search 
phase of the conceptual design process. After reviewing the literature, it became 
evident that decomposition had not received much attention in the previous 
studies and was poorly understood. Therefore, a cognitive model of internal 
search, including decomposition, was formulated. Decomposition was 
incorporated as a special search method. The model also allowed making of 
hypotheses about how decomposition could be empirically studied. An 
experiment following the single comparable study (Ho, 2001) was used to 
investigate the subject. The results from the sixteen designers involved in two 
independent tasks showed that implicit decomposition was used very often, as 
the model predicted. Explicit decomposition, however, was applied by few 
subjects and did not seem to work as expected in either of the tasks. Possible 
explanations for these results will be discussed next, followed by the 
consideration of theoretical and experimental limitations of the current work. 
Results 
As stated, the designers were very solution-oriented. This finding was not 
unexpected (Cross, 2004), but provokes some thoughts. The small number of 
problem-focused statements found in the protocols contradicts the underlying 
theory of verbalization to some extent (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). If we assume 
that subjects use implicit decomposition, and thus possess a goal stack in their 
STM, it can be asked why these goals are hardly ever verbalized, and what 
causes this failure to report subgoals. Maybe the designers just restrained 
themselves from verbalizing the goals because such verbalizing was not 
requested in the task assignment. Or maybe the goals are not stored in STM, but 
in LTM or LT-WM, excluding the current subgoal. However, if they were 
stored in LTM, a delay would be expected between solving different 
subproblems with the breadth-first strategy, and data from the current research 
do not directly support this option. Hence, the reasons for solution orientation 
remain unclear. 
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It is interesting that some subjects verbalized solution principles which were 
never sketched, even though the designers had been explicitly told to take 
advantage of all occurring ideas. While the number of discarded ideas was 
small, this finding clearly points out that idea evaluation is a firmly fixed 
component of the process and that overriding this criticism is difficult. This fact 
could be explained by assuming that an evaluation process is automatic and 
quite independent of conscious strategic control in the model. 
Recognit ion 
The analysis found some clear cases of recognition. The number was quite small 
and, although no assumptions were made about this figure, there is a possibility 
that the current coding procedure may not have identified all recognition-based 
designs. On some occasions, it was clear that a subject had retrieved certain 
concepts from LTM, e.g. a household robot in Plant. However, these concepts 
were not reproduced as such, but adapted to the constraints of the particular 
task. Therefore, as predicted by the cognitive model, it seems that the results 
produced by recognition undergo the same evaluation process as all other results 
before the output and that they may be iterated by the solution search 
mechanisms to synthesize new solutions. The total lack of recognition-based 
concepts in the Forest task is also understandable. The trunk removal machine 
has not received much publicity and it is likely that none of the participants had 
seen one, whereas plant watering devices are much more common. In a careful 
examination of a two recognized concepts (subject #12, concept 1 and subject 
#16, concept 4), it is noticeable that a drip bottle is not a common solution for 
watering plants in real life, but more of an analogical solution. This implies that 
recognition is somewhat flexible and possibly related to the analogy-retrieval 
process (see Thagard et al., 1990). 
It was previously claimed that the recognition which has been considered here, 
differs from the concept of recognition used in the memory research. This might 
not be the case. Others have suggested sophisticated conceptualizations of 
recognition (Eysenck & Keane, 2000; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1992), going 
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further than what was proposed here, and theory of recognition should definitely 
be considered more carefully in the future. 
Control  strategies 
Control strategies could be determined reliably. As was expected, structured 
strategies were used frequently. However, the notable difference between the 
two tasks raises some concerns. First, it should be noted that if the depth-first 
and breadth-first classes are combined before the comparison, then the change 
from structured to mixed strategies is less radical. These two top-down 
strategies were applied in 79% (N = 71) of all designs in Plant and in 62% (N = 
97) in Forest. The threefold increase of mixed solutions in Forest (13% vs. 38%) 
is more puzzling. The difference is not due to a single outlier, but caused by 
several subjects adopting an alternative strategy, as shown by the change in the 
strategic orientations (see Table 8). While it is possible that the disagreement is 
partially attributable to an actual difference between the tasks, it is also 
conceivable that the different problem decomposition schemes may have 
increased the proportion of mixed strategies. Especially as some exceptions 
(described in Experimental method chapter) were made in the PDS coding of 
Forest. This could partially explain the significant change in balance between 
the two approaches. 
A qualitative analysis of the concepts produced by designers classified as 
mixed-strategy oriented (N = 4) showed that three of them applied a strategy 
that could be called an ‘opportunistic depth-first strategy’. This means that they 
neglected some of the essential subgoals and developed only one or two 
principles for each new idea (subject #9, #15, and #16). This neglect appeared to 
be random. One mixed-strategy oriented designer (subject #13) clearly used the 
breadth-first strategy, but constantly omitted one particular and essential 
subfunction from her designs and was thus considered to use the mixed strategy. 
Thus, her behavior should be labeled incomplete breadth-first, not opportunistic. 
Finding mixed strategies and the fact that subgoal selection in structured 
strategies followed no clear priority order, implies that there is some 
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opportunism or lack of discipline in the design idea-generation process. This 
opportunism seems to override earlier priorities given to subproblems, as there 
is no fixed order in which subgoals are attended to. Opportunism might be 
caused by the fact that a memory search related to a subgoal produces several 
alternative answers. For example, a subject who is applying a breadth-first 
strategy may find several solutions for a single subgoal and pick one of them as 
a starting point for the next concept because that is the cognitively easiest thing 
to do. This could result in apparently opportunistic designs. 
Decomposit ion 
The results about decomposition were surprising as explicit decomposition was 
detected in few cases. This contradicts the assumptions of educational design 
literature (Pahl & Beitz, 1984; Ulrich & Eppinger, 2003), which is quite fixed 
regarding the notion that problem decomposition should precede the solution 
search. There are some possible explanations for this finding. First, the subjects 
were not instructed to use decomposition. Also, the task assignment particularly 
aimed at producing a great number of alternative designs quickly. It is possible 
that this instruction may have guided subjects’ selection of solutions search 
methods. Secondly, poor ecological validity, in terms of available time and 
commitment to the design process, may have affected designers’ actions and 
consequently, they may not have perceived that explicit decomposition should 
be used in a task like this. Most previous studies have used more extensive 
assignments (e.g. Ball et al., 1994; Goel & Pirolli, 1992; Ho, 2001). Thirdly, the 
tasks were thus relatively easy as the subjects were able to generate almost ten 
concepts on average. It might be that in harder tasks, where implicit 
decomposition proved to be insufficient, the explicit decomposition would be 
used. Finally, it is possible that the subjects were not familiar enough with 
explicit decomposition to utilize it. This possibility should be considered in the 
future research, by ensuring subjects’ familiarity with decomposition. Here it 
was only assumed that the senior engineering students had already become 
skilled at explicit decomposition in their studies or in their design occupations, 
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as the functional decomposition is introduced on two courses of their 
curriculum. 
The results also showed that even when decomposition was used, it succeeded 
poorly. Two of three subjects failed in presenting a complete functional 
structure. However, this discovery can be also interpreted as a failure to report 
the results, rather than to decompose, so another type of success indicator should 
be used. Also, it is possible that explicit decomposition, in the available time, 
simply did not produce any new discoveries about the subgoals, which had 
already been discovered using implicit decomposition. The observation that 
explicit decomposition was not performed at the onset of the task may be due to 
the same reasons as the general lack of decomposition - the subjects did not 
associate the textbook method with the current situation. There was no a relation 
between recognition- and decomposition-based design (first recognize, then 
decompose) that could have explained this behavior. 
It was originally proposed that decomposition facilitates problem solving by 
reducing the problem space of a problem (Simon, 1996). In this paper, 
decomposition has been presented as a way to produce tangible problems for 
memory search and synthesis. Thus, I cannot agree with Simon that 
decomposition primarily helps by reducing the problem space. Because if a 
theoretical problem space of undefined complexity is associated the main 
problem, it is practically infinite. Decomposition is said to reduce the 
complexity by ruling out some portions of the problem space. But if some, even 
considerable, finite region of an infinite space is ruled out, the resulting portion 
remains infinite. Even though human LTM is finite, it is more convincing to say 
that problem decomposition helps by providing a set of new starting points for 
memory search, which is one of the most important methods of the solution 
search. Hence, I find the concept of a problem space problematic when talking 
about human ill structured problem solving. 
This discussion suggests that problem decomposition is a complex process and 
the relation of implicit and explicit decomposition is unclear. Based on the 
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current findings, it seems that explicit decomposition is a test for the initial 
subgoal structure that has been produced by implicit decomposition. This 
interpretation would mean that explicit decomposition would become especially 
important if the original goal stack was faulty or incomplete. This study showed 
some indirect evidence of this being possible. In the protocol of subject number 
five, the designer considered the possibility to replace one subgoal with another. 
This activity did not meet the current criteria for explicit decomposition, but it 
might actually be an instance of explicit decomposition, if considered in an 
alternative way. 
It seems justified to think of explicit decomposition as a complement of implicit 
decomposition. If implicit decomposition happened automatically, but not very 
reliably, then the main purpose of explicit decomposition would be to challenge 
the subgoal structure and refine it. It seems likely that these two modes of 
decomposition are otherwise highly similar, but explicit decomposition requires 
more time and effort. The possible reason for this could be the retrieval of 
additional knowledge that is relevant to the problem under consideration, 
making it similar with analogical transfer. This hypothesis is partially supported 
by the previous studies (Ball & Ormerod, 1995), but should be investigated in 
the future. 
Theoretical issues 
The proposed cognitive model of solution search is comprised of several 
information processing phases. The model is serial in nature and follows the 
symbolic tradition in claiming that all knowledge structures and processes are 
carried out on a single, general-purpose processing unit in successive steps. This 
holds on to the unitary view of cognition (Anderson, 1983). There are several 
theorists of cognitive science who have questioned this type of unified 
architecture. Probably the best known alternative is the modular approach, 
which assumes that cognitive functions are implemented as specialized modules 
of some kind, working in a parallel (e.g. Fodor, 1983; Pinker, 1994). This view 
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is often defended by biological evidence, and used to explain the remarkable 
computational capacity related to some cognitive functions. 
Two views are not completely mutually exclusive, as both can include similar 
cognitive structures. However, there may be considerable differences between 
systems that operate either in serial or in parallel. For instance, if the phases of 
the cognitive model, that has been considered here, were executed in parallel, it 
is likely that the contents of shared STM would change more rapidly and 
unexpectedly than they would change in a serial architecture. A method, such as 
protocol analysis that is assumed to report STM contents, would thus be affected 
by this difference. It should be noted that in even a parallel architecture, only 
some functions would be modular, and several learned skills would still be 
serially processed by a general-purpose structure. In the context of design 
problem solving, processes such as memory search and analogical mapping 
might be modular, whereas other operations would be still performed in a serial 
manner. 
It seems likely that the presented model is a serial approximation of a parallel 
architecture. The assumed architecture is not the only open question about the 
model. Referring to the aim of cognitive science to present theories as 
algorithms (see section 1.1), it must be asked, could this model be implemented 
as a program? Considering similar models, this might be possible, but 
challenging. Some constituent processes of the GenePlore model (see section 
2.4) have been computationally modeled, but the model as a whole has not been 
formally explicated to this date. The same goes for the SIAM model (see section 
2.4) by Nijstad (2000). Several memory models have been formalized 
(Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981), but they present only fractions of the whole and 
are typically difficult to apply for realistic tasks. It is possible that a general 
architecture, such as ACT-R, could be used for this purpose. 
There is a doubt whether the architectures and computational theories of 
cognition are adequate for describing human cognition (see the recent debate in 
Fodor, 2000 and Pinker, 2005). This is a real dilemma that potentially 
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undermines all computational explanations. It has been argued that some ill 
structured problems possess properties that are incompatible with the standard 
symbolic information processing model, called the Computational Theory of 
Mind (Goel, 1995). Goel thinks that sketching, for one, is an activity that cannot 
be properly reduced to syntactic symbolic representations. He has also provided 
some evidence to support this claim, but still thinks that computational theories 
can, with some limitations, be used to describe cognition (ibid). 
Finally, there are some possible difficulties with the theoretical assumptions. A 
simple model of declarative (semantic) knowledge representation was assumed. 
However, it is possible that design knowledge is non-conceptual or visual 
knowledge, which would make it harder to identify recognition. It has been also 
questioned how reliable method protocol analysis is and whether the theory of 
verbalization is plausible (see Ericsson & Simon, 1980).This work also assumes 
that the protocol analysis can be trusted, although some negative evidence was 
already encountered in the form of implicit design actions. Pointless to say, the 
reliability of current findings is connected to these underlying assumptions. 
Experimental issues 
Experimental work can be carried out even though the theory would be 
incomplete. However, an empirical study has its own limitations. First of all, it 
is acknowledged that this study could not control all possibly significant 
variables, such as attention, motivation, mood, alertness, or fatigue, which may 
affect a complex task such as the one used. This is unfortunately the standard 
situation in psychological quasi-experimental research and there was no reason 
to assume that any of these variables would affect problem decomposition. 
Another issue related to the experimental setup concerns the possible effect of 
examples. While the analyzed tasks did not contain any examples (no-examples 
condition), the half of the tasks were preceded by a task with examples 
(examples condition). Strategies possibly adopted in the examples condition 
may have affected the no-examples condition, as happens in a negative/positive 
transfer or set effect (Eysenck & Keane, 2000). Unfortunately, this transfer 
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effect, caused by the examples, is indistinguishable from the effect that may 
have been caused by having two tasks in a row. This is because the experimental 
design did not consider factor interaction (see section 3.2).  
Finally, it must be noted that the protocols were coded by only one person. It is 
usually suggested to use several independent coders to achieve greater reliability 
that can be measured with inter-rater agreement (kappa) (Gero & McNeill, 
1998; van Someren et al., 1994). This study omitted this procedure mainly due 
to its explorative nature, but this measure should be taken in the following 
studies. 
Open questions 
This preliminary exploration has yielded results that raise thoughts about 
problem decomposition in conceptual design. As the results are still quite 
approximate, the future investigation should focus on at least the following 
issues: 
• Can some task environments bring up the explicit decomposition 
instinctively? 
• Does the use of explicit decomposition have an effect on design outcomes? 
• Can the use of explicit decomposition be included in a wider range of design 
tasks? 
• Can explicit decomposition be made more effective? 
• Is implicit decomposition a domain-dependent or a domain-independent 
skill? 
• How are implicit and explicit decomposition related to each other? 
• How does expertise effect decomposition? 
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This study did not find any clear evidence that explicit decomposition would 
considerably influence design outcomes. The consequences of using implicit or 
explicit decomposition in concept design should be investigated. If it turned out 
that either mode of working would be more favorable, then the current findings 
should be reconsidered. If explicit decomposition proved beneficial, then it 
would follow that the possibilities to guide designers to take advantage of it 
should be investigated. On the other hand, if the use of explicit decomposition 
constantly produced inferior results, then it would be advisable not to waste time 
with it. 
The possible task- or domain specificity of decomposition is an essential 
question. Explicit decomposition has been found in other studies, especially 
those that have used more complete design tasks, going from early planning to 
the detail design stage (Ball et al., 1994). A subject for a longitudinal study 
could be to assess decomposition as an attainable skill and its connection to 
expertise. It is possible that explicit decomposition is only adopted after 
acquiring noticeable expertise, or maybe implicit decomposition works very 
well right from the start. Additional investigations are also needed to clarify the 
relation of implicit and explicit decomposition and the underlying cognitive 
mechanism. In short, there are several open questions related to decomposition 
that should be investigated. 
Conclusion 
This work has applied the concepts and methods of cognitive science to 
investigate conceptual design. Cognitive science, being a multidisciplinary 
domain (Schunn et al., 1998), fits well for this purpose. This work has 
relied on the existing cornerstones, mostly on the work done by Simon and 
Akin (Akin, 1986; Simon, 1973, 1996) which presents a unified picture of 
design as problem solving activity. In the literature review, it became 
evident that the design theory is still in progress, and the development of a 
comprehensive theory of design cognition has not been recently a major 
interest. However, it was noted that the recent progress in cognitive 
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creativity research (Finke et al., 1992) has to the development of a similar, 
although abstract, model of creative activity. That model was used as an 
exemplar, together with the existing theories of design problem solving, to 
synthesize a cognitive model of conceptual design. 
After developing the model, empirical tests were conducted. This initial 
exploration, in the form of sixteen psychological experiments, provided 
additional evidence that decomposition works in two modes, called explicit 
and implicit decomposition. The latter form is highly automatic and 
corresponds to the concept of decomposition found in the problem-solving 
literature. Unlike what could be predicted from the literature, explicit 
decomposition was observed seldom in the experiments. While this may be 
due to the artificial nature of the experiments, it also questions the 
significance of explicit decomposition in design idea generation. Current 
results suggest that future studies should examine the effects and 
constraints of decomposition in a greater detail to evaluate its practical 
importance. In whatever fashion problem decomposition will be interpreted 
in the future investigations, this study has shown that problem 
decomposition is an integral part of the problem-solving process, but more 
in the way described by the psychological literature than in the way 
assumed by the design literature. 
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Appendix A 
Initial and concluding questionnaires 
In original language 
G1 Alkukysely 
Tee merkintä oikean vaihtoehdon vasemmalla puolella olevaan ympyrään tai viivalle 
Henkilötausta 
1.1 Sukupuoli  O Mies  O Nainen 
1.2 Syntymävuosi 19____ 
1.3 Äidinkieli ______________ 
1.4 Sähköpostiosoite ____________________________ 
Suunnittelutausta 
1.4 Opintojen vaihe  ________ opintoviikkoa (kymmenen viikon tarkkuudella)  
1.5 Työkokemus suunnittelusta ________ vuotta (½ vuoden tarkkuudella) 
1.6 Opintojen / työn suuntautumisala  O koneen suunnittelu 
    O teollinen muotoilu 
    O muu, mikä: _______________________ 
1.7 Suoritetut korkeakoulututkinnot (jos olet jo valmistunut, jätä muuten tyhjäksi) 
 O DI  O TM O Muu, mikä ________________________ 
Lähtötilanne kokeeseen 
Arvioi miten hyvin seuraavat väittämät kuvaavat tämän hetkistä oletilaasi, skaalalla 1-6 ympyröimällä 
oikea vaihtoehto 
  Hyvin paljon  Jonkin verran  Ei lainkaan 
1.8 Fyysinen väsymys 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.9 Mentaalinen väsymys 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.10 Olen motivoinut osallistumaan kokeeseen  
  1 2 3 4  5 6 
Kokeen kulusta 
Olen tietoinen, että kokeen materiaalit ovat toistaiseksi luottamuksellisia ja en saa kertoa kokeen 
tehtävien varsinaisesta sisällöstä tutkimusryhmän ulkopuolisille henkilöille. Tiedän, että minulla on 
oikeus keskeyttää koe milloin tahansa. Kokeessa tuottamani materiaali käsitellään luottamuksellisesti 
hyvän tutkimusetiikan mukaan. Koe liittyy tieteelliseen työhön, joka raportoidaan niin, ettei 
henkilöllisyyttäni voida yhdistää tuottamaani koeaineistoon. Tiedän, että kokeenjärjestäjät voivat 
käyttää kokeessa tehtyjä luonnoksia, pätkiä videosta tai ääniraidasta julkaisujen ja konferenssiesitysten 
osana. 
Espoossa, 
Nimikirjoitus   __________________________ 
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A ) Tehtäväkohtainen tietämys 
Seuraavassa on kysymyksiä äskeisiin tehtäviin liittyen. Arvioi väitteiden oikeellisuutta tekemällä 
merkintä vaihtoehdon edessä olevaan ympyrään. 
2.1 Oliko ensimmäisessä tehtävässä suunniteltu laite ja tehtäväympäristö sinulle entuudestaan tuttu? 
O Ei lainkaan 
O Vähän  
O Jonkin verran 
O Hyvin tuttu 
2.2. Oliko toisessa tehtävässä suunniteltu laite ja tehtäväympäristö sinulle entuudestaan tuttu ? 
O Ei lainkaan 
O Vähän  
O Jonkin verran 
O Hyvin tuttu 
2.3 Sait toisessa tehtävistä käyttöösi esimerkkikonsepteja, olivatko ne mielestäsi hyödyllisiä? 
O Ei lainkaan 
O Vähän  
O Jonkin verran 
O Erittäin 
2.4 Käytitkö esimerkkejä suunnittelun aikana? 
O En lainkaan 
O Vähän 
O Jonkun verran 
O Hyvin 
2.5 Kumpi tehtävä oli mielestäsi vaikeampi? 
O Ensimmäinen 
O Toinen 
O Yhtä vaikeita 
O En osaa sanoa 
2.6 Haluatko saada sähköpostilla yhteenvedon tutkimuksen tuloksista? 
O Kyllä 
O Ei 
2.7 Voiko sinuun ottaa yhteyttä jos tarvitsemme tulevaisuudessa koehenkilöitä vastaantyyppisiin 
kokeisiin? 
O Kyllä 
O Ei 
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B) Lopputilanne 
Arvioi nykyinen tilanteesi seuraavien väittämien suhteen skaalalla 1-6 ympyröimällä oikea vaihtoehto 
  Hyvin paljon  Jonkin verran  Ei lainkaan 
2.8 Fyysinen väsymys 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.9 Mentaalinen väsymys 1 2 3 4 5 6 
C) Esimerkkien muistaminen 
Seuraavalla sivulla on kaksi aiemmin käytetyn kaltaista konseptipaperia. Nyt sinun pitäisi palauttaa 
mieleesi aiemmin toisen tehtävän yhteydessä sinulle esitetyt esimerkkikonseptit. Toteuta esimerkit niin 
hyvin kuin muistat samalla tavalla kuin aiemmatkin konseptit. Hahmottele konseptit arkille, älä 
kiinnitä huomiota yksityiskohtiin. Aikaa tähän tehtävään sinulla on kolme minuuttia. 
D) Miten esimerkit mielestäsi vaikuttivat suunnittelutehtävään? 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
E) Koe loppuu – kiitos osallistumisesta 
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Appendix B 
General brief 
In original language 
 
Annan sinulla kohta ensin tehtäväpaperin, mutta sitä ennen vielä kerron yleisesti tehtävistä. Tehtävissä 
pitää tehdä konseptiluonnoksia annetusta aiheesta. Konseptit piirretään erillisille vastausarkeille, jotka 
ovat tässä.  
{vastauspaperin jakaminen} 
Konsepti on siis laitteen ulkoasun luonnos, yksinkertainen piirros. Esitä konseptit niin selkeästi, että 
laitteen toimintaperiaate ja sen olennaisimmat komponentit ovat tunnistettavissa ja voit tarvittaessa 
lisätä tekstiä selventämään piirrosta. Tekstien tulee olla kuitenkin mahdollisimman lyhyitä, sillä 
kirjoittaminen vie aikaa suunnittelulta. 
Tee siis mahdollisimman paljon, mahdollisimman erilaisia konsepteja, kaikki ideat mitkä mieleen tulee 
paperille, ei turhaa kritiikkiä. Ei hienostelua, ainoastaan olennaisimmat piirteet näkyviin. 
En tule enää kokeen aikana antamaan lisää informaatiota, ainoastaan tarvittaessa muistutan sinua 
jatkamaan ääneenajattelua. Voit käyttää tehtävänantopaperia tehtävän aikana. Tehtävän suorittamiseen 
sinulla on aikaa 20 minuuttia, ilmoitan kun aikaa on jäljellä kaksi minuuttia niin voit ottaa vielä 
loppukirin. Aika alkaa kun käännät tehtäväpaperin. 
Aloitetaan, kerro kun olet lukenut tehtävän niin aloitan ajanoton ja voit kääntää tehtäväpaperin ja alkaa 
tekemään konsepteja. Tässä vaiheessa voit vielä kysyä, huomaa että kaikki mitä ei ole tehtävässä 
määritelty on suunnittelijan päätettävissä. 
{ensimmäisen tehtäväpaperin jakaminen} 
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Task assignments 
The task assignments presented here are original Finnish assignments, Kasvi and Metsä (Plant and 
Forest). English translations are available from the author on request. The schematic figure and 
concept images have been omitted from the electronic publication. 
G2B Tehtävä Kasvi 
K.1 Taustaa 
Huonekasvien kastelu on yksinkertainen toimenpide, jonka hoitaminen omistajan poissaollessa jää 
kuitenkin usein muiden ihmisten tehtäväksi. Olemassaolevat automaattiset ratkaisut eivät ole teknisesti 
riittävän hyviä tai sosiaalisesti hyväksyttäviä. 
K.2 Tehtävä 
Suunnittele automaattinen huonekasvien kastelulaite, tee laitteesta mahdollisimman paljon toisistaan 
poikkeavia konsepteja. Laite pitää yhden tai useamman kasvin elossa vähintään kuukauden ajan.. 
Laitteen pitää toimittaa kasville noin yksi desilitra vettä viikossa.  
 
Konseptisuunnittelun tueksi on paperin kääntöpuolella kuva huonekasvista, jonka on tarkoitus toimi 
innoittajana sunnittelulle. Saat käyttää tehtävänantoa ja esimerkkiä tehtävän aikana. 
Ilmoita nyt kokeenjohtajalle, niin voit kääntää paperin ja aloittaa suunnittelun 
 
 
The schematic figure used in the Plant task, 
originally located on the reverse side of the paper 
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G3A Tehtävä Metsä 
M.1 Taustatietoja 
Metsähakkuun jäljiltä metsään jää kantoja. Kannoissa on kuitenkin runsaasti hitaasti hajoavaa puuta, 
joka pitää poistaa metsästä hyötykäytettäväksi ja nopeuttamaan metsän uusiutumista. Tällä hetkellä 
kannot siirretään pois metsästä yhdellä laitteella ja silputaan metsän ulkopuolella erillisessä laitteessa. 
M.2 Tehtävä 
Suunnittele talousmetsän kantojen hävityslaite, tee laitteesta mahdollisimman paljon erilaisia 
konsepteja. Laitteen tarkoitus on poistaa kannot metsästä tehokkaasti paikan päällä. Laite liikkuu 
jaloilla, näitä ei tarvitse konseptoida (kts. kuvaa seuraavalla sivulla). 
 
Konseptisuunnittelun tueksi on paperin kääntöpuolella kuva kohteesta, jonka on tarkoitus toimi 
innoittajana sunnittelulle. Saat käyttää tehtävänantoa ja esimerkkiä myös tehtävän aikana. 
Ilmoita nyt kokeenjohtajalle, niin voit kääntää paperin ja aloittaa suunnittelun 
 
 
 
The schematic figure used in the Forest task, 
originally located on the reverse side of the paper 
 
 Lassi A. Liikkanen Exploring Problem Decomposition Appendix D  
Appendix D 
Problem decomposition schemes 
PDS for Plant 
Main 
function 0. Plant watering device  
Solution 
type 1. Devices attached to pot  
 2. Independent devices  
Subfunctions 3. Water supply 4. Regulation 
Principles 30. Separate tank 40. Mechanical timer 
 31. Water pipe 41. Valve or choke 
 32. Rain wall 42. Humidity sensor 
 33. Condensation water 43. Pipe, hose, or string size 
 34. Ice 44. Mail man 
 35. Bound water 45. Weight sensor 
 36. Tank in soil 46. Surface permeability 
 37. Tank in pot or in plant board 47. Phone, PC, or electric timer 
 38. Waterin can 48. Tank decomposition 
 39. Steamer 49. Controlled vaporization 
 310. Closed system 410. Controlled by transfer SubF 
   411. Controlled by energy SubF 
   412. Liquid pressure difference 
   413. Liquid buffering 
   
Subfunctions 5. Transfer 6. Mediator 
Principles 50. Hose, pipe, or gutter 60. Plant mover 
 51. Capillar hose, stick, or string 61. Soil changer 
 52. Pouring system 62. Robot 
 53. Gravity; syphon or drain 63. Rotating ground 
 54. Sprinkler 64. Household air 
 55. Pump, water gun, or pressure 65. Plant air 
 56. Syphon 66. Humidity collector 
 57. Diffusion   
 58. Absorption   
 59. Scooping or sprinkling   
   
Subfunctions 7. Energy source  
Principles 70. Mains  
 71. Sun  
 72. Battery  
 73. Wind  
 74. Rubber band drive  
 75. Candle or camping cooker  
 76. Explosive  
 77. Gravity  
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PDS for Forest 
Main 
function 0. Trunk disposal  
Solution 
type 1. Integrated devices  
 2. External devices  
Subfunctions 3. Destruction 4. Removal 
Principles 30. Burning on site or in a tank 40. Hook 
 31. Detonation or shooting 41. Root destroyer 
 32. Decomposition into soil 42. Cork screw 
 33. Organisms or animals 43. Loading shovel or plow 
 35. Water pressure 44. Harvester feet 
 35. Chemical 45. Lever arm 
 36. Ultrasound 46. Hydraulic grap 
 37. Electricity 47. Cable and pulling 
 38. Bacterial 48. Water cutting 
   49. Vibrator 
   410. Hoover 
   411. Wedge 
   412. Hydraulic tentacle 
   
Subfunctions 5. Dispersal 6. Recovery 
Principles 50. Saw 60. Bag or cart 
 51. Press 61. Suction 
 52. Circular saw 62. Hydraulic arm or shovel 
 53. Drum chamber 63. Cart or platform 
 54. Sprocket wheels 64. Screw mechanism 
 55. Gnawing, cutting, grinding, sand down 65. Arm or jib crane 
 56. Drilling   
 57. Screw mechanism   
 58. Smash agains ground   
 59. Axe or blade   
     
Subfunctions 7. Attachment to machine 8. Mediating 
Principles 70. Jib crane  mechanisms 
 71. In front 80. Applicator 
 72. Below 81. Metering device or syringe 
 73. Behind 82. Transportation vehicles 
 74. In a foot   
 75. Above   
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Appendix E 
Complete coded verbal protocols of all subjects 
Omitted from this document version. 
Please, contact the author in case You wish to obtain the protocols. 
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Appendix F 
Control strategy summaries 
Specified for each subject and each concept generated by the subject including  
a summary of strategies over all concepts 
R Recognition     
D Depth-first      
B Breadth-first     
M Mixed      
       
Subject 
# Concept Strategy  Subject # Concept Strategy 
1 1 D  9 1 M 
  2 D    2 B 
  3 D    3 M 
  4 D    4 M 
  5 D    5 D 
  6 D    6 M 
  7 M    7 B 
  8 D    8 B 
  9 B    9 M 
  10 D    10 M 
  11 D    11 M 
  12 D    Total   
  13 B    R 0 
  14 B    D 1 
  15 D    B 3 
  16 D    M 6 
  Total       
  R 0  Subject # Concept Strategy 
  D 12  10 1 M 
  B 3    2 B 
  M 1    3 B 
      4 B 
Subject 
# Concept Strategy    5 B 
2 1 M    6 B 
  2 M    7 B 
  3 D    8 B 
  4 B    9 B 
  5 B    10 B 
  6 B    11 B 
  7 B    Total   
  8 B    R 0 
  9 B    D 0 
  Total      B 10 
  R 0    M 1 
  D 1     
  B 6     
  M 2     
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Subject # Concept Strategy  Subject # Concept Strategy 
3 1 D  11 1 B 
  2 D    2 M 
  3 D    3 D 
  4 M    4 M 
  5 D    5 B 
  6 D    6 M 
  7 D    7 M 
  8 D    8 B 
  9 D    9 D 
  10 D    10 D 
  Total      11 D 
  R 0    12 D 
  D 9    13 D 
  B 0    Total   
  M 1    R 0 
      D 6 
      B 3 
      M 4 
       
Subject # Concept Strategy  Subject # Concept Strategy 
4 1 B  12 1 R 
  2 B    2 B 
  3 B    3 D 
  4 B    4 B 
  5 B    5 B 
  6 M    6 B 
  7 B    Total   
  8 M    R 1 
  9 B    D 1 
  Total      B 4 
  R 0    M 0 
  D 0     
  B 7  Subject # Concept Strategy 
  M 2  13 1 M 
      2 M 
Subject # Concept Strategy    3 B 
5 1 B    4 M 
  2 B    5 M 
  3 B    6 M 
  Total      7 M 
  R 0    8 M 
  D 12    9 M 
  B 3    10 M 
  M 1    11 M 
      12 B 
      13 M 
      14 M 
      Total   
      R 0 
      D 0 
      B 2 
      M 12 
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Subject # Concept Strategy  Subject # Concept Strategy 
6 1 B  14 1 B 
  2 B    2 B 
  3 B    3 B 
  4 B    4 B 
  5 B    5 R 
  6 B    6 B 
  7 B    7 D 
  8 B    8 B 
  9 B    Total   
  10 B    R 1 
  11 D    D 1 
  12 B    B 6 
  13 B    M 0 
  Total       
  R 0  Subject # Concept Strategy 
  D 1  15 1 M 
  B 12    2 M 
  M 0    3 M 
      4 M 
Subject # Concept Strategy    5 B 
7 1 D    Total   
  2 D    R 0 
  3 D    D 0 
  4 D    B 1 
  5 D    M 4 
  6 D     
  7 D  Subject # Concept Strategy 
  8 D  16 1 R 
  9 M    2 D 
  10 M    3 M 
  11 D    4 R 
  12 M    5 M 
  13 M    6 M 
  Total      7 M 
  R 0    8 B 
  D 9    Total   
  B 0    R 2 
  M 4    D 1 
      B 1 
Subject # Concept Strategy    M 4 
8 1 R     
  2 B     
  3 B     
  4 B     
  5 B     
  6 B     
  7 B     
  Total       
  R 1     
  D 0     
  B 6     
  M 0     
 
